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Mobility Measures
Naomi Schoenbaum*
Geographic mobility is a celebrated feature of American life.
Deciding where to live is seen not only as a key personal freedom, but
also a means of economic advancement. Millions of Americans move
each year over great distances. But while this right to travel is
safeguarded by the Constitution, these mobility decisions are not entirely
free. In terms of the decision to move long distances, employment and
family reasons are central, and a regime of employment and family law
“mobility measures” play a significant role in regulating why and how
we move. This Article first sets forth this new framework of “mobility
measures,” which are constituted by employment law sorting (moving
across employers and space for employment purposes) and family law
clustering (moving with a legally defined, portable family unit). These
mobility measures not only enable and facilitate long-distance moves
with billions of dollars of subsidies per year, but they motivate these
moves to take a particular form: to move for employment purposes,
taking only our nuclear family with us. In this way, we are encouraged
by the law to move, yet the law limits our ability to mitigate the
disruption caused by the move. So while mobility has its benefits, this
Article argues that it has underappreciated costs. Long-distance moves
destroy place-specific investments with our closest supporters that are
crucial for everyday functions, as well as economic productivity. These
relationship and economic costs affect all long-distance movers, but
weigh particularly heavily on one group—women. This combination of
employment sorting and family clustering makes mobility more
problematic than it needs to be. This Article offers ways of altering
employment sorting and family clustering to optimize the balance
between the two and reap more benefits from mobility with fewer costs.

* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. This paper
has benefited enormously from conversations with and comments from Daniel Abebe, Kathy
Abrams, Kerry Abrams, Susan Appleton, Douglas Baird, Anya Bernstein, Alex Boni-Saenz,
Eleanor Brown, Mary Anne Case, Tony Casey, Ros Dixon, Lee Fennell, David Fontana, Jake
Gersen, Tom Ginsburg, Mitu Gulati, Laura Hildner, Dan Ho, Aziz Huq, Brian Leiter, Gillian
Lester, Saul Levmore, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Tom Miles, Martha Nussbaum,
Angela Onwachi-Willig, Randy Picker, Rachel Rebouche, Laura Rosenbury, Andres Sawicki,
Julia Simon-Kerr, Lior Strahilevitz, Matthew Tokson, Laura Weinrib, David Weisbach,
Deborah Widiss, Steve Willborn, and Noah Zatz. I also thank participants at the Law and
Society Conference, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference, and the
University of Chicago Law School Works in Progress Seminar for helpful feedback.
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These reforms would soften sorting while expanding clustering, and at
the same time would encourage certain forms of mobility (particularly
to cities) that would permit a more optimal combination of sorting and
clustering.
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I. INTRODUCTION

How portable is your life? This is the question that, on average,
tens of millions of Americans have to decide every year. The
portability question, as the New York Times recently noted, 1 has
taken on newfound significance at a time of high unemployment and
slack job markets, which have led many to look for employment in
distant locations. Indeed, while many of us know of the massive
stimulus legislation President Obama sponsored, what is less known
is that there are billions of dollars allocated in that law to facilitate
Americans moving because of these economic realities. 2 This law fits
within a larger legal regime that calibrates the portability of our lives.
Yet we do not see the role the law plays in shaping our moves—or
how the law could better shape mobility decisions and their
consequences.
Geographic mobility is one of the defining features of the
American ethos. 3 Freedom of movement is associated with the
highest values of American democracy: liberty, autonomy, and
upward mobility. And we have enshrined the notion of free
movement with a constitutional right: the right to travel. 4
Residential mobility has been a central American feature from the
country’s inception. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United
States in 1831, he observed with amazement how easily Americans
changed residences: “In the United States, a man will carefully
construct a home in which to spend his old age and sell it before the
roof is on. . . . He will settle in one place only to go off elsewhere
shortly afterwards with a new set of desires.” 5
American exceptionalism vis-à-vis mobility persists. Americans
are twice as mobile as Europeans. 6 Between 2008 and 2009, 37.1

1. Phyllis Korkki, How Portable Is Your Life?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at B14.
2. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 § 1833,
123 Stat. 115, 386 (2009) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2297–98 (2012)) (providing
increase in the relocation allowance for federal trade adjustment assistance); U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, UI MODERNIZATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS—APPROVED APPLICATIONS 1 (2011),
available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#modern (reporting
federal payments to states for unemployment insurance modernization, including for benefits
due to relocation).
3. Shigehiro Oishi & Ulrich Schimmack, Residential Mobility, Well-Being, and
Mortality, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 980, 980 (2010).
4. See Leonard B. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47,
47–49 (1956).
5. Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 623 (1835)).
6. See Larry Long, Residential Mobility Differences Among Developed Countries, 14
INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 133, 137 (1991). The reasons posited for these differences range
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million Americans moved. 7 Legal scholarship to date has continued
to celebrate American mobility. In a recent article, Professor Robert
Ellickson described the benefits of a residential move as “massive,”
praising mobility as a way to seek better matches for housing,
housemates, neighborhood, and municipality. 8
But not all moves are created equal. For moves of a greater
distance—currently nearly one-third of all moves 9—there are more
substantial costs. Employment law and family law are in the middle
of those costs—not housing law, as scholars like Ellickson and others
have assumed. 10 For these moves, employment and family
considerations are central, 11 with the result that in a typical recent
year, almost seven million Americans moved an average of 400 miles
due to their job or family. 12 This Article is about this category of

from cultural (the U.S. is a nation of immigrants that keeps moving) to geographic (larger
country size correlated with higher mobility), but none have been proven. See id. at 135–46;
Raven Molloy, et al., Internal Migration in the United States, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 173,
191–92 (2011).
7. See DAVID K. IHRKE, ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY: 2008 TO 2009 2 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf.
8. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON HOUSEHOLD MOVES: SHOULD
FOOTLOOSE AMERICANS ENVY THE ROOTED FRENCH? 36 (2010), available at
http://www.nd.edu/~ndlaw/conferences/lawecon/Ellickson.pdf.
9. See IHRKE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. The census separates intracounty moves from
intercounty, interstate, and international moves. For purposes of this Article, I consider the
latter three types long-distance moves. From 2008 to 2009, long-distance moves had an
average distance of approximately 400 miles and a median distance of approximately 100 miles.
Id. at 15 tbl.6. 24.1% of long-distance moves were over 500 miles. Id.
10. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 8; Stephanie M. Stern, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009).
11. See IHRKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 15–17. Employment-related reasons were the
most significant for intercounty moves (35.5% in total), followed by family-related reasons
(26.6%), and then housing-related reasons (24.3%). Id. at 16 tbl.7. Employment-related
reasons become even more salient for moves of greater distances. See id. at 16 (43.8% for
moves of 50 to 199 miles; 54% for moves of 200 to 499 miles; and 43.9% for moves of 500 or
more miles).
12. See id. at 16 tbl.7 (26.6% of a total of 11,034,000 long-distance movers for family
reasons, or 2,935,044, and 35.5% of 11,034,000 long-distance movers for employment
reasons, or 3,917.070). While geographic mobility in the U.S. remains high from a
comparative perspective, it has nonetheless been in decline, and has reached near historic lows.
See id. at 2–3 (noting a very recent slight uptick in moves but due to intracounty moves);
WILLIAM H. FREY, THE GREEN AMERICAN MIGRATION SLOWDOWN: REGIONAL AND
METROPOLITAN DIMENSIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/reports/2009/1209_migration_frey/1209_migration_frey.pdf.
So,
for
example, less than a decade ago, the comparable figure for employment- and family-related
long-distance moves was 10 million Americans. See JASON P. SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2002 TO 2003 12
tbl.F (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf. Despite the
decline in the total number of long-distance moves in the last decade, there has been a modest
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long-distance domestic moves, 13 and the intersection of employment
law and family law that regulate them.
A larger constellation of laws, including the federal mortgage tax
deduction, 14 military transfers, and highway subsidies, among others,
undoubtedly influences long-distance mobility. Employment law and
family law are the focus of this Article not only because they regulate
the areas of our lives that motivate a significant proportion of longdistance moves, 15 and thus are key factors in determining why, when,
and how often we move over longer distances, but also because they
play a critical role in regulating the welfare and distributional
consequences of long-distance moves, as discussed below.
The combination of employment sorting as a result of
employment law and family clustering as a result of family law is a
central feature of long-distance mobility and is what this Article
terms “mobility measures”: the various features of employment law
and family law that enable and facilitate long-distance mobility.
Employment “sorting” means that employment law enables and
facilitates employees to sort easily across employment situations and
in so doing they can and often do sort across long distances.
Employment sorting allows for mobility at virtually any time,
without consideration of socially and economically significant placespecific roots. Family “clustering” means that family law enables and
facilitates a cluster of family relationships that are, because of this
increase in the relative proportion of long-distance moves due to employment and family
reasons. See IHRKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 tbl.7 (family reasons increased from 25.9% to
26.6% of long-distance moves and employment reasons increased from 32.6% to 35.5% of
long-distance moves). Although the “Great Recession” and the crash of the housing market
have been blamed, see FREY, supra note 12, at 1, the slowdown in mobility predates these
developments, and the cause is uncertain, see Molloy, supra note 6, at 175. This Article is a
response to uncritical proposals to subsidize mobility in the face of this slowdown. See infra
note 78 and accompanying text.
13. This Article focuses on domestic mobility issues. In the international context, the
difficulties of mobility are, in most cases, magnified and complicated by immigration law. As a
general matter, the distance is greater, making it more difficult to maintain strong ties in
another time zone, and there are cultural and language barriers to overcome. Note though that
the two primary long-distance mobility considerations raised by this Article—employment and
family—are two of the driving forces behind immigration policy. See Adam Cox & Eric Posner,
Delegation in Immigration Law (Feb. 2012) (unpublished draft) (arguing that immigration
law delegates authority to employers, families, and states), available at
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924382. In a nation as large as the United States,
spanning several time zones, with metropolitan areas all over the country, domestic mobility
can mean more than it would in a smaller country.
14. Although home ownership is negatively correlated with mobility, the effect of the
deduction on ownership is modest because larger deductions go to the wealthiest who would
likely own homes anyway. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 37 (2003).
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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cluster, made portable. Although the family cluster is meant to
provide social insurance upon long-distance moves, by failing to
recognize other significant relationships across space, it places a
ceiling on the family cluster instead of a floor. While it is difficult to
quantify the precise causal role of mobility measures, as this Article
demonstrates, these laws are key factors in enabling and facilitating
long-distance moves.
Conventional understandings of employment law and family law
fail to realize the ways in which they regulate mobility, and how,
through their relationship to mobility, these areas of law are linked. 16
Theories of employment law have been primarily concerned with the
terms of the employment relationship, but have not appreciated how
these terms affect employment relationships across space. 17 Core
areas of employment law, such as the at-will doctrine and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enable geographic mobility by
minimizing attachments between employees and employers, 18
allowing employees to cross employers and geography with ease.
And employment law facilitates mobility with subsidies to offset the
costs of relocation undertaken for long-distance sorting moves. 19
Likewise, theories of family law have centered on which
relationships the law will recognize and what rights and duties will
be mapped on to these relationships, 20 but the spatial component of
these legal rules has been largely neglected. Enabling family laws
construct the relevant cluster across space as the nuclear family,
permitting us to take these crucial family relationships with us as we
move long distances. Facilitating family laws provide tax breaks and
other financial support for defined family clusters moving long
distances and create child-custody rules that facilitate long-distance
16. By connecting employment law to the regulation of intimate relationships, this
Article is part of an emerging body of scholarship critiquing the current narrow confines of the
family law canon. See, e.g., Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative
Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 753, 761–65 (2011); Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 117, 135–36 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63
STAN. L. REV. 351, 369 (2011).
18. See DAWN D. BENNETT & LAURA P. HARTMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR BUSINESS
30 (6th ed. 2009).
19. See sources cited supra note 2; IRS, SOI TAX STATS – INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS, COMPLETE YEAR DATA STATISTICAL TABLES, TABLE 1—INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX, ALL RETURNS: SOURCES OF INCOME AND ADJUSTMENTS, TAX YEAR 2009, available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=133414,00.html (noting over two
billion dollars in relocation tax deductions).
20. See generally NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008).
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moves.
This Article makes the following core claim about long-distance
moves and the mobility measures that regulate them: although
mobility confers a host of significant benefits in terms of economic
growth and labor-market efficiency, 21 as well as in promoting selfdetermination and preference satisfaction, 22 mobility measures fail to
take account of the significant costs of long-distances moves. First,
the combination of employment sorting and family clustering has
harmful welfare consequences—relationship costs in terms of lost
local strong ties and economic costs in terms of lost productivity—
that should be considered in calibrating mobility measures. Second,
there are distributional consequences to long-distance mobility. The
benefits of mobility are not shared equally within the family, and the
burdens tend to be borne disproportionately by women. Mobility
measures do not adequately account for these distributional aspects
of long-distance moves.
On the first point, when individuals or families uproot from their
communities for employment sorting, family clustering means that
the only form of social cushion they bring with them is the nuclear
family. Relationship costs result from the loss of close relationships
outside the nuclear family, known as “strong ties”— the ties that
involve the greatest amounts of “reciprocity, emotional intensity and
intimacy” rather than “casual” interactions. 23 Local strong ties
provide support that is crucial for sustaining our sense of self and
everyday existence, especially for those with caregiving
responsibilities. 24 However, these ties are damaged by the
combination of sorting and clustering under current legal rules. 25
And while employment sorting may bring economic benefits, longdistance movers and their employers may also take an economic hit.
In addition to the welfare deficits resulting from the loss of strong-

21. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 58–61 (2001) (arguing
that mobile homebuyers can “shop for a community” that fits their preferences); Ilya Somin,
Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202–04
(2011) (discussing how mobility across jurisdictions enables “foot voting” that leads to a more
informed citizenry).
23. Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
953 n.119 (2005).
24. See Corey M. Clark, Relations Between Social Support and Physical Health,
PERSONALITYRESEARCH.ORG, www.personalityresearch.org/papers/clark.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2012).
25. See William H. Simon, Introduction: Lawyers and Community Economic
Development, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1821, 1821–23 (2007) (arguing that strong ties do not have
to be based on geographical proximity).
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tie support, there is also significant lost productivity, for which the
current legal regime of sorting and clustering is at least partially to
blame. 26 Shortcomings in decisionmaking, including information
deficits and cognitive biases, that lead employees and employers to
make weighting errors in assessing the costs and benefits of sorting
suggest that sorting decisions may not be welfare maximizing under
the current legal regime.
On the second point, the economic costs of mobility measures
are not borne equally within the family. One spouse—the sorting
spouse—will drive the sorting move and gain the benefits of sorting,
while
the
other
spouse—the
clustering
spouse—will
disproportionately fill the cushioning support role of the family
cluster. This distribution of sorting and clustering falls along gender
lines and plays a significant role in the ongoing gender wage gap,
with repercussions for single, married, and divorced women alike.
This Article thus also contributes a spatial understanding of legal
barriers to gender equality that has gone unnoticed.
Despite mobility’s significant benefits, then, once it is recognized
that mobility is not an unmitigated good, laws and policies that
uncritically promote mobility require further examination. The costs
and distributional consequences of mobility flow in large part
because even though employment and family law regulate the same
area of social experience—long-distance moving—their regulation is
not coordinated. To remedy these costs and consequences, I propose
that employment law and family law interact even more than they
do. While mobility has its benefits, my proposals focus on adjusting
the costs of sorting and clustering for employers, employees, and
families to optimize mobility by reaping more of its benefits with
fewer costs. I offer ways to adjust the relative costs of hiring longdistance as compared with local employees, so that employers will
internalize the costs of long-distance sorting, as well as ways to
provide better support to long-distance sorters and their families. I
also recommend ways that family law could recalibrate the family
cluster to recognize the geographic significance of strong ties outside
the nuclear family. Finally, I propose mitigating the costs of longdistance moves through an “agglomeration” mechanism that brings
more employment opportunities and strong ties to the same place:
the city. While others have sung the praises of cities, 27 they have not

26. See Janice Y. Benjamin & Lorrie Eigles, Support Services to Relocated Families
Increase Employee Job Performance, 17 J. CAREER DEV. 259, 259–60 (1991).
27. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2011);
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yet recognized the benefits of agglomeration from the perspective of
mobility measures.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces the legal
regime of mobility measures: the laws that enable and facilitate
employment sorting and family clustering. Part III complicates the
story by setting forth the relationship and economic costs that result
from mobility measures. Part IV further complicates the story by
setting forth the distributional consequences that result from
mobility measures. Part V presents ways that mobility measures
might be modified to optimize the benefits of mobility while
alleviating its costs.
II. MOBILITY MEASURES
Employment law and family law are central parts of the story of
geographic mobility. The core areas of employment law sort and the
core areas of family law cluster to create a law of mobility measures.
In the context of mobility, the combination of employment law
sorting and family law clustering means that individuals move long
distances for employment and bring their nuclear families with them.
Central employment and family law doctrines enable this form of
mobility by making these long-distance moves more likely to
transpire and by defining the terms of these moves. Other key
employment and family law doctrines directly facilitate long-distance
mobility by adjusting the costs and consequences of these moves to
make them more likely and more rewarding. All together, billions of
dollars of government funds are spent on employment and family
measures that enable and facilitate sorting and clustering. 28 The
amalgam is a profound and sometimes problematic combination of
mobility measures.

A. The Law of Work and Mobility
Sorting is a definitional feature of employment law. In the
employment context, sorting means that individual employees move
across employment situations to maximize their labor value.
Maximizing labor value may mean finding employment, earning
higher wages, developing human capital, or achieving more fulfilling
work. The values underlying employment sorting are twofold: liberty

David Schleicher, The City as Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507.
28. See supra note 19.
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and efficiency. The “free choice to work” includes not only whether
one works, but where one works. 29 Employment sorting is also seen
to promote efficiency and growth. Because workers vary in their
productivity across jobs, “[t]he problem is one of optimally assigning
workers to jobs.” 30 Unbounded sorting, especially across geography,
expands opportunities and allows for better matches between
workers and firms. 31
Geographic mobility flows from this sorting rationale for
employment law. Place of residence is linked to place of work
because of the norm of (and need for) workers’ physical presence at,
and thus residential proximity to, the workplace. 32 Under the
neoclassical economic theory of the labor market, geographic
mobility serves as an equilibrating mechanism that distributes people
and wealth. 33 Workers move from areas where jobs are dwindling (or
lower paying) to areas where workers are needed (or earnings are
higher). 34 Long-distance moves in particular are investments to
achieve higher wages and develop human capital. 35 This is especially
true for workers with greater investments in human capital, who can
reap greater benefits from long-distance moves. Indeed, longdistance moves are more common among workers with more
education, which means that this Article addresses a phenomenon
that, while surely touching all segments of the population, is more
common among a particular social class. 36

29. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 531 (1997).
30. Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972,
974 (1979).
31. See HOLGER BONIN, ET AL., IZA RESEARCH REPORT NO. 19: GEOGRAPHIC
MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: OPTIMISING ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BENEFITS 52
(2008),
available
at
http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_19.pdf.
32. Residential proximity to the workplace is relative, and depends on willingness to
commute. See infra Part V.C on commuting.
33. See Michael Greenwood, Human Migration: Theory, Models, and Empirical Studies,
25 J. REGIONAL SCI. 521, 527 (1985).
34. See id.
35. See Kathryn L. Shaw, The Influence of Human Capital Investment on Migration and
Industry Change, 31 J. REGIONAL SCI. 397, 401 (1991).
36. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that 23% of movers with a bachelor’s
degree made an interstate move, as compared with 15% of movers with less than a high school
education). Although short-distance moves are more common than long-distance moves on
average, one education group was more likely to move more than 500 miles than to move
under 50 miles: those with graduate degrees. Id. at 11. See infra note 99 for additional
discussion of education, class, and mobility.
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1. Enabling laws
Core employment law doctrines enable sorting, and in so doing,
enable geographic mobility. By defining when and why employment
relationships with employers and particular worksites can permissibly
begin and end, employment law regulates the frequency with which
employees sort, and thus the frequency with which they move over
longer distances to sort. By keeping attachments between employees
and employers (or worksites) to a minimum, enabling laws
encourage sorting both on the part of employers—by allowing them
to hire, fire, and transfer at will—and employees—by allowing them
to depart and start at will. Enabling laws also encourage sorting by
eliminating barriers to sorting, including discrimination, residency
requirements, and job-lock 37 associated with employer-provided
benefits.
a. Maintaining a loose tie between employees and workplaces.
Employment law that regulates the tie between employers and
employees favors sorting, regardless of whether it relates to job
switching or job transfers. The key doctrine governing this tie is
employment-at-will. 38 Under this doctrine, either an employer or
employee can terminate the employment relationship without cause,
at any time, which means there are no general restrictions on
employees’ ability to sort across firms. 39 Because protections against
termination (for example, anti-discrimination laws and terminations
against public policy) serve as only limited exceptions to employers’
broad firing discretion, 40 employment-at-will remains the organizing
principle of the employment relationship. 41 The ability of employees
to move freely across employers under the at-will regime embodies
the notion of employment sorting. 42 And employment sorting

37. The phenomenon of workers staying in jobs to avoid the loss of health insurance has
been referred to as “job-lock.” Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and
Job Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on Job Lock, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 86, 86
(1994).
38. Although the at-will relationship is governed by state law, all states but one
(Montana) apply some version of it. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will
Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L.
REV. 453, 459 (2008).
39. See RICHARD A. BALES, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (2007).
40. Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79 (2007).
41. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 73, 77 (2000).
42. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
973–74 (1984).
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embodied in the at-will regime has only intensified with changes in
the employment relationship in recent decades. Until the 1970s,
most employees worked for one employer throughout their careers,
moving up the ranks of a single hierarchical firm. 43 Now, most
American workers are mobile, with shorter job tenure, sorting
between firms as the means to career advancement. 44 Employmentat-will enabled this enhanced sorting; under a legal regime of job
security, this transformation in the employment relationship could
not have occurred.
This regime also has a spatial component. Because employmentat-will places no restrictions on employees’ ability to sort across
employers, it enables geographic mobility that is often a component
of employment sorting. 45 In contrast to a system of fixed
employment contracts, an at-will regime provides greater flexibility
that makes it more likely employees will move long-distance for a
new job. Rather than being restricted to sorting when a contract
ends, the at-will regime allows employees to search for and take
advantage of new job opportunities continually, regardless of when
or where they materialize. 46 Especially in the new economy, where
workers expect that each new job will provide human capital returns,
long-distance mobility for employment sorting is a key component
of maximizing human capital. 47 And in an age when employees are
more likely to switch careers and fields, at-will employment frees
them to take advantage of location-specific opportunities that arise in
other fields, particularly those that are time-sensitive or in a
regionalized industry (e.g., dot-com boom jobs in Silicon Valley).
In an era of downsizing, when employers are more likely to
utilize their at-will rights, long-distance moves may simply be a
necessary part of remaining employed. In a slack labor market, if the
only job available requires an employee to move, that is what she will
do. But for workers with less human capital, employment-at-will may
result in job turnover with fewer compensating benefits from sorting.
So, despite the liberty associated with sorting, especially for those

43. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001).
44. See id. at 548.
45. See Bonin, et al., supra note 31, at 34 (finding a strong association across E.U.
countries between geographic mobility and the frequency of job changes over one’s lifetime).
46. See Long, supra note 6, at 140–41 (positing that the difference between contract
and at-will employment regimes may help to explain the difference in mobility rates in Europe
and the United States).
47. See Shaw, supra note 35, at 400–01.
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with fewer job options and especially in a slack labor market,
employment-at-will may lead to sorting without reward. 48
Geographic mobility for employment sorting purposes underlies
the law’s approach to non-compete clauses. Courts will typically
enforce these clauses if they are “adjudged ‘reasonable’ in time and
geographical scope.” 49 Therefore, a reasonable restriction foreclosing
competitive activity within a particular geographic area would require
the employee to move to another geographic area if the employee
wishes to continue in the competitive occupation—a likely
proposition given the employee’s human capital investments in that
particular occupation. Courts have upheld geographic restrictions
based on business contacts the employee made or could have made
during the course of her employment, allowing a reasonable scope to
encompass a commutable region (and sometimes more), thus
necessitating a long-distance move to work in the occupation upon
enforcement of the covenant. 50
Employment law enables geographic mobility even when it
comes to staying with the same employer by maintaining a loose tie
between an employee and her particular worksite. The employer’s
right to terminate an employee at will includes the right to transfer
employees to a new (and distant) location. 51 While the at-will system
of course allows the employee to quit to avoid the transfer, the
matter is often not that simple. Unequal bargaining power between
employee and employer, the employee’s firm-specific human capital,
and lack of other employment options may make it difficult for an
employee to exercise this right to exit. 52
Federal law that protects employees from layoffs enables
transfers. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
48. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed
Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84, 95, 97
(2007) (discussing how employment-at-will is associated with lack of job security and labor
mobility, and concomitant risks for employees).
49. Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton & Barton’s Staffing Solutions, Inc., 192 F.3d 662,
669 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting from a panel enforcing a restrictive covenant not to
compete); see generally, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian
Malsberger ed., 2d ed. 1998).
50. See John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49, 67–69
(2003).
51. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 972 (assuming right to transfer is subsumed by the atwill relationship).
52. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 408–09 (1986) (“The longer the
employee has worked for a company, the more specific his job skills have become, the less
mobile he is, and the more his investment in the firm becomes his only means of livelihood and
self-respect.”).
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(WARN) Act, which applies to employers with one hundred or more
employees—a small minority of employers—requires covered
employers to give notice of mass layoffs, plant closings, and
relocations that result in specified employment losses. 53 But when an
employer relocates, the employer does not have to count as part of
the employment-loss totals any employee offered a transfer to a site
within a reasonable commuting distance, or a transfer to any other
site that the employee accepts. 54 That the employer can avoid layoff
considerations by relocating employees, even to a distant location,
encourages transfers, including long-distance ones. It will not be easy
for the employee to reject an offer of certain employment, as even a
faraway job may be more valuable than unemployment insurance
benefits (or the limited backpay available under the WARN Act). 55
In certain instances, employment law may even remedy the violation
of employment rights with a long-distance transfer. Under the
National Labor Relations Act, an employer may not relocate a plant
to avoid unionization. 56 But the NLRB has ordered as a remedy for
such violations that the employer reinstate employees at the new
plant location and pay their moving expenses. 57 While the tradeoff
between transfer and layoff is one many employees might be willing
to make, such transfers nonetheless weigh heavily on employees in
ways that mobility measures fail to capture. 58
b. Removing barriers to sorting. Employment law sorts via
provisions that remove barriers to employment sorting. This section
discusses three of these areas of law: anti-job-lock measures, antidiscrimination law, and restrictions on employment residency
requirements.
First, congressional efforts to reduce “job-lock”—employee
immobility caused by employer-provided non-wage benefits,
53. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2006). The employment-loss level that triggers protection varies
depending on the reason for the employment loss. Compare id. § 2101(a)(2) (50 employees
for plant closing), with id. § 2101(a)(3) (500 employees, or 50 employees if they make up at
least 33% of the employer’s active workforce, for mass layoffs), with id. § 2102(d) (the number
of employment losses for two or more groups of workers reaches the threshold level, during
any ninety-day period, of either a plant closing or mass layoff).
54. Id. § 2101(b)(2).
55. Id. § 2104(a)(1)(A). A handful of states regulate work relocations, primarily by
requiring notice to employees of such relocations. See, e.g. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400–1406
(West 2011).
56. See Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
57. See Robert A. Swift, Plant Relocation: Catching Up With the Runaway Shop, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1135, 1160–61 (1973) (collecting cases).
58. See infra Parts III and IV discussing the costs of long-distance moves.
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especially health insurance—are sorting measures. Employment is the
primary source of health insurance in the United States. 59 Employees
who fear losing their insurance coverage upon switching jobs avoid
new employment opportunities. 60 Legal reforms over the last several
decades have taken aim at remedying this anti-sorting feature of
employment benefits. The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation
Act (COBRA) 61 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) 62 made health insurance more portable
across jobs by extending the opportunities for coverage after an
employee leaves a job and by limiting restrictions that an employer
can place on benefits for preexisting conditions. The sorting
component of these correctives is evident in the floor debate on
HIPAA: “Everyone agrees that job lock must be unlocked so that
people can move from job to job . . . .” 63 Health care reform—
including the recent federal health care overhaul—that loosens the
link between employment and health insurance by providing
coverage outside of employment, has also been justified as a job-lock
corrective. 64 With regard to pensions, reductions in vesting periods
for defined benefit contribution plans are part of these pro-sorting
reforms. 65
To the extent these measures free employees to sort across jobs,
they also enable employees to sort across geographic regions. By
assuring continuing health insurance coverage, these measures
reduce the cost of switching jobs, which is particularly significant for
59. More than 90% of private employees receive their benefits from their or a family
member’s employer. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY & HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 at. fig.7 (2009). Whether this will change with the
implementation of health care reform is a matter of debate. See Jonathan Cohn, About that
McKinsey Report . . . the Critics Were Right, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 24, 2011, 12:25 PM),
http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/90696/healthcare-mckinsey-obama.
60. See Alac C. Monheit & Philip F. Cooper, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory
and Evidence, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 68, 82 (1994) (reviewing mixed literature on the
magnitude of job-lock and finding a modest effect).
61. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2006) (requiring that employers allow employees and
their dependents the option to purchase coverage for a period of time after it would otherwise
terminate, which reduces the concern of lost coverage upon leaving a job and allows employees
to remain covered during a waiting period).
62. Id. §§ 1181-1183 (2006); I.R.C. §§ 9801-9806 (2006).
63. 142 CONG. REC. H9780 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gus Bilirakis);
Id. at H9787 (statement of Rep. Pat Roberts) (remarking that nearly four million Americans
per year might be able to sort better with HIPAA’s job-lock correctives in place).
64. See Monheit & Cooper, supra note 60, at 69.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006). As the majority of employees with pensions now have
defined contribution plans with no vesting requirement, such as 401(k) plans, pension plans
have even less impact on employees’ mobility. See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying
into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1194–95 n.49 (2010).
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already costly long-distance sorting moves. For married couples in
which a spouse’s job provides health insurance for the family, a longdistance move for a married employee will likely mean that the
spouse will have to switch jobs, too. With anti-job-lock measures, the
family can move, even if it disrupts the spouse’s job, with protection
for their health insurance coverage. 66 Greater sorting may thus be
one unintended effect of health care reform. 67
Second, anti-discrimination law removes barriers to employment
sorting. Without prohibitions on discrimination in hiring,
employees, especially those who belong to groups traditionally
marginalized in the labor market, could be limited to working at
firms that hired workers of their “type.” 68 Without protections
against discrimination, employees’ ability to sort across firms would
be limited. Laws like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 define
categories of employees who might not enjoy the full benefits of
sorting and bar hiring discrimination against them. 69 While
discrimination persists, and hiring discrimination in particular is
notoriously difficult to prevent, 70 anti-discrimination laws aim to
open all jobs to employees of all types. Anti-discrimination law is
especially important for enabling long-distance sorting in light of
regional differences in attitudes towards protected groups, including
women, minorities, and various religions. Federal anti-discrimination
law therefore seeks to create a national labor market for employees to
sort among firms across geographies without regard to protected
group status.
Third, constitutional regulation of employment enables long-

66. For lower income workers, the lack of employer-provided non-wage benefits, such
as health insurance, can contribute to excessive job switching, without the compensating
benefits from sorting to a better a job. See SUNHWA LEE, KEEPING MOMS ON THE JOB: THE
IMPACTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHILD CARE ON JOB RETENTION AND MOBILITY
LOW-INCOME
MOTHERS
iv
(2007),
available
at
AMONG
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C360KeepingMoms.pdf. Among low-income working women,
the greatest predictor of employment success is staying in the same job—the opposite of
mobility—and employer-provided health insurance can play a key role. Id.
67. That is, if health care reform leads to less employer-provided coverage. See Stone,
supra note 48.
68. Limited matching between employer and employee could occur even in the absence
of employer animus. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59–72 (1992). If employee preferences are determined
by group characteristics, then employers may prefer homogeneous workforces to reduce the
chance of conflict among their employees. Id.
69. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)–(e-17) (2000).
70. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time that You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 99, 125–26 (2007).
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distance sorting through the right to travel. 71 By the early nineteenth
century, the “right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to
reside in any other state, for purposes of . . . professional pursuits”
was recognized. 72 More recently, in assessing the constitutional right
to travel, the Supreme Court explained that “[f]reedom of
movement is important for job and business opportunities,” 73 and
that “a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel to
another State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory
restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the other State.” 74
This protection has meant that courts have struck down residency
requirements for hiring and professional associations. 75 The right to
travel thus not only embodies the norm of employment sorting, but
enables this type of sorting by barring restrictions on it, at least by
public employers.
c. Facilitating laws. Sometimes employment law acts as a
mobility measure by rewarding long-distance sorting with
compensation, including direct subsidies for the relocation of the
worker, as well as indirect subsidies for maintaining the family cluster
upon a long-distance sorting move. Under the Trade Act of 1974, 76
the federal government provides billions of dollars 77 of assistance to
workers injured by import competition who relocate long distance 78

71. “American constitutional law has long frowned on rules that impair the right of
internal mobility.” Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 390 (2008); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (holding that a state’s one-year residency requirement to receive federal welfare benefits
unconstitutionally infringed upon the right to travel); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 284–302 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that the dormant
commerce clause limits restrictions on mobility).
72. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
73. Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519–20 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
74. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 535 (1978).
75. Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (striking down hiring
preference for civil service employment for veterans based on state residency requirement). The
Court has also struck down residency requirements for membership to the state bar, but under
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487
U.S. 59 (1988); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2006).
77. DEP’T OF LAB., TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE OF THE SENATE AND COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
19
(2010),
available
at
http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/docs/AnnualReport10.pdf (giving state-by-state financial
statistics of assistance).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a)(2) (2006) (covering only moves not within a reasonable
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for other employment. Eligible workers are entitled to job training,
job-search allowances, and relocation allowances to move for a new
employment opportunity. 79 The tax code permits an income-tax
deduction for long-distance, work-related moves, 80 which subsidizes
employment sorting. Expenses incurred “in connection with the
commencement of work . . . at a new principal place of work”—for
example, the cost of movers, real estate agents, and the like—are
deductible, without any cap. 81 In 2009, deductions for moving
expenses totaled about $2 billion. 82 The enthusiasm for additional
sorting subsidies has only increased as anxiety about unemployment
in the Great Recession remains high. One recent proposal
recommended an extension of federal funding, akin to trade
adjustment assistance, for long-distance sorting moves in the form of
a general “mobility bank” that would provide relocation loans to a
broader set of unemployed workers. 83
Another form of sorting subsidy aims to offset relocation costs
not just for the individual, long-distance sorter, but also for the
sorter’s family cluster that joins her in the move. The Trade Act 84
and the relocation tax deduction 85 further subsidize sorting in this
way by subsidizing the relocation of the sorting employee’s family.
Unemployment insurance (UI), as “modernized” by the recent
stimulus package, also facilitates long-distance sorting through this
type of indirect subsidy. UI is a composite state and federal program
that provides up to twenty-six weeks of partial wage replacement. 86
Historically, states denied UI benefits to workers (“clustering
spouses”) who quit a job to follow a spouse (“sorting spouses”) who
needed to relocate for employment because such quits were deemed
commuting distance).
79. Id. § 2298(b). A certified worker is eligible for relocation assistance when the
worker is unemployed, local employment is not available, and the worker has an offer of
“suitable employment affording a reasonable expectation of long-term duration in the area in
which the worker wishes to relocate.” Id. § 2298(a)(2).
80. I.R.C. § 217(c) (covering only moves of a particular mileage).
81. I.R.C. § 217(a); I.R.S. PUBLICATION 521 CAT. NO. 15040E 7, 11 (2010).
82. See IRS, supra note 19.
83. Jens Ludwig & Steven Raphael, The Mobility Bank: Increasing Residential Mobility
to Boost Economic Mobility, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 7 (2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10_mobility_bank_ludwig_rap
hael/10_mobility_bank_ludwig_raphael.pdf.
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a)(2) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 617.3(q) (1989) (defining family as
spouse and dependents for purposes of covered expenses).
85. I.R.S. PUBLICATION 521 (2010), supra note 81, at 8 (explaining that the deduction
applies for “anyone who has both [the] former and new home as his or her home”).
86. Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 335, 340, 344–45 (2001).
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voluntary. 87
In response to criticism of the failure to acknowledge mobility
and the proportion of two-income families affected, 88 Congress
included in the federal stimulus package additional conditions on
incentive funds for state UI programs to provide benefits to
clustering spouses. 89 A state satisfies the condition when it does not
disqualify an employee from receiving UI benefits because the
employee leaves her job to accompany her spouse “(I) to a place
from which it is impractical for such individual to commute; and (II)
due to a change in location of the spouse’s employment.” 90 For the
clustering spouse to qualify for benefits, the sorting spouse must be
relocating for employment purposes at a distance that would make
commuting infeasible. 91 The provision reduces one of the significant
costs associated with long-distance sorting: the loss of spousal
income. In this way, UI benefits for clustering spouses subsidize
long-distance sorting.
B. The Law of Family and Mobility
Long-distance moves raise questions of relationship fracturing:
who within a community of intimates—not only those within our
homes, but also extended family, friends, caregivers, and those who
receive our care—will come with us in our travels, and how does this
community of intimates constrain us in our travels? Through its
distribution of rights and privileges, family law answers this question
with family clustering: people move with their nuclear family units.
The selective nature of family clustering—that some but not all of
our intimates move with us—encourages mobility by creating selfsufficient, portable family units. Defining a limited number of
relations that are part of the family cluster provides support upon
relocation without making it too difficult to uproot.

87. See, e.g., Slusher v. Dep’t of Commerce, 354 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
See infra Part IV.B.1 for a further explanation of these terms.
88. See Implementing the Unemployment Insurance Modernization Provisions of the
Recovery Act in the States, in NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT 7 (Feb. 2010),
http://nelp.3cdn.net/8316a05b0d995d0885_k3m6bny02.pdf.
89. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 1103(f)(3)(B)(iii).
90. Id.
91. A state may provide broader eligibility, but the Unemployment Insurance
Modernization Act does not require it. See Letter from Dep’t of Labor, Unemployment
Insurance Program Letter No. 14-09, Attach. III, at 6 (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL14-09.pdf.
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1. Enabling laws
Foundational family law doctrines encourage nuclear family
clustering, and in so doing enable long-distance moves by making
part of our lives more portable. Family law privatizes care and
support within the domestic family. 92 Family law’s determination of
who has rights and duties as family members determines with whom
and near whom we want (and perhaps need) to live. Through a
distribution of benefits and burdens, family law prioritizes the
nuclear family above other intimate relationships—friendships,
extended family, and others who provide care and support—creating
the nuclear family as the relevant unit for clustering purposes. Family
law shapes the family cluster by mandating obligations of care and
dependence between spouses 93 and from parent to child. 94
However, family clustering functions as much by granting rights
and duties to those inside the family as by denying rights and duties
to those outside of it. Family law does not recognize the network of
caregivers who assist parents in childrearing. 95 For example, benefits
to care for a child, such as those afforded under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), are typically limited to parents, as is the
right to see a child at all. 96 The Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute granting visitation rights to nonparents, under which
grandparental visitation was ordered over a parent’s objections, as
overly intrusive to parental authority. 97 Family law also denies to
friends the benefits that it grants to families, such as FMLA leave, the
ability to make decisions about medical care or to inherit under state
intestacy rules, and the recognition of certain private agreements. 98

92. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2187 (1995).
93. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 720 (West 2011) (requiring that spouses “contract
toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 98 (1999) (“Married persons owe each other fidelity, support, and assistance.”). The
doctrine of necessaries obligates spouses to discharge each other’s debts for necessary expenses.
See, e.g., Forsyth Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Chisolm, 467 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1996) (requiring wife to
pay for husband’s medical expenses).
94. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 503 (5th ed.
2010) (“All American jurisdictions recognize a parental duty to support minor children.”).
95. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 387 (2008) (discussing how family law pays
little heed to the network of caregivers who assist parents in childrearing).
96. See id. at 407–08. The Family and Medical Leave Act is an exception by providing
leave for an employee to care for an ailing parent. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006).
97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (plurality opinion).
98. Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007); see
also Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 697–98 (2007).
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Because rights and duties associated with care and support are kept
within the family, the nuclear family need not remain geographically
close to the extended community of intimates. For example, because
a grandparent does not have a legal right to visit her grandchildren, a
child and his or her parents can move away from the grandparents
without any legal restriction. On the flip side, the family cluster also
means that the family members—spouses and children—remain
together when the family moves to provide and receive the care
privatized within the family. If a family cannot remain intact, often a
move will not be made, because this care would not be available
through public or other private means.
Nor does family law acknowledge the care that the nuclear family
provides to those outside of it. The general lack of legal ties between
adult children and their parents, and the associated mobility it
enables, 99 can be viewed in contrast to a proposed law in China that
would require adult children to provide their parents with physical
and emotional care, and would give parents a right to sue to enforce
it. 100 Such an obligation to visit elderly parents would limit longdistance mobility, as most people, especially those without extensive
resources, would need to live near their parents to comply. 101
The selective granting of rights and duties structures the
domestic family as the part of our support network that needs to
come along on a long-distance move. In this way, family law
provides some social insurance upon such moves. In fact, this shockabsorbing function of the family cluster may make us more
comfortable with the notion of employment sorting. It is hard to
imagine that mobility would be viewed so glowingly without the
default rule that at least some of one’s closest intimates would
cushion the blow of a move. While family law enables long-distance
99. The proportion of adult Americans living far from their parents varies based on
education level. More than half of married individuals with both parents alive and living
together lived within ten miles of either their own parents or their in-laws, and two-thirds lived
within twenty-five miles, but those with a college education are separated from their parents by
a median distance of one hundred miles. Peter A. Rogerson et al., The Spatial Separation of
Parents and Their Adult Children, 83 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 656, 660, 663
(1993).
100. China Law to Make Children Visit Parents, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12130140
(explaining
the
proposed
amendment to China’s Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Aged).
101. The legal history illuminates the relationship between employment sorting, family
clustering, and care between adult children and their parents. Lawsuits seeking to enforce
contracts or for quantum merit compensation for care provided by adult children to their
elderly parents arose with the industrial age and the rise of geographic mobility to seek work
away from one’s family of origin. See HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE
YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012).
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moves by family clustering, some relationships are not portable, an
issue discussed in later Parts. This “underclustering” feature of family
law perhaps paradoxically enables mobility. Keeping the number of
necessary family members to a minimum increases the portability of
the clustered family unit by allowing nuclear families (and singles) to
uproot from a network of caregivers and friends. Even if “it takes a
village” to raise a child, it would be logistically difficult, if not
impossible, to take the village along on a move. The self-contained
cluster avoids this difficulty.
For mobility purposes, when relationships are sufficiently
analogous to marital or parental relationships, they might be brought
along on a move. But a long-distance move imposes such costs and
risks that, even among cohabiting couples, one partner might not
move across the country for the other without a marital
commitment. There are other relationships—for example, the
relationships of same-sex couples—that may be afforded status in
some jurisdictions but not others. These variations in family law
across jurisdictions may affect choice of domicile and thus mobility,
as those seeking particular rights might choose to move to (or
remain in) a jurisdiction that affords them those rights.102
2. Facilitating laws
Beyond enabling mobility by constructing a portable family
cluster, family law subsidizes and eases the long-distance moves of
the family cluster. By adjusting the costs of maintaining the family
cluster at moments of mobility, the law puts a thumb on the scale in
favor of the family cluster, as well as mobility.
a. Direct subsidies. Laws such as the Trade Act and tax
deductions that subsidize the family’s relocation along with the
sorting employee not only facilitate employment sorting, but also
family clustering. 103 Likewise, changes in UI benefits for clustering
spouses described above provide direct subsidies for mobility of the

102. For instance, a gay couple that wants to marry can only do so in certain states, and
the couple may need to remain domiciled in those states to continue to enjoy the benefits of
the marriage. Interstate recognition of same-sex marriages is limited by the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), state “mini-DOMAs,” and conflicts of law rules. See Andrew
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for
Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143 (2005); see also Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance:
Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31,
33, 38 (2010) (discussing inconsistent state laws of parentage of children born through
artificial insemination and implications for mobility).
103. See supra Part II.A.2.
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family cluster. 104 Recall that before recent changes in the law, courts
routinely denied UI benefits to clustering spouses. For example, a
court considered a case in which the claimant “left her employment
. . . to be with her husband but urges that her decision to do so was
for the preservation of her ‘American home way of life which is the
basic foundation of this nation.’” 105 The court “agree[d] . . . that it
is desirable to preserve marriages and keep families together,” but
denied benefits because the quit was voluntary. 106 The later
recognition of this “American home way of life” (modified by the
prevalence of two-income households 107) with the granting of UI
benefits to clustering spouses facilitates mobility to preserve the
family cluster. In keeping with family clustering, the subsidy is
provided only to spouses and not to other intimates. In addition to
its incentive effect, the policy sends a doubly-reinforcing, familyclustering message: a spouse should quit a job to relocate for her
spouse’s employment (and the law will subsidize such a departure),
but no one else should (and if they do, the law will provide no
assistance).
b. Facilitating mobility and clustering after divorce. Family
clustering as a mobility measure remains salient for married couples
with children after divorce. After divorce, family clustering faces a
challenge. When married couples with children divorce, a question
may arise about relocation. 108 Increasingly, shared custody
arrangements, and thus post-divorce family unity, are seen to be in
the child’s best interest. 109 If both parents want to have a substantial
relationship with the child, the parents likely need to live near one
another. Mobility seems in tension with clustering once the cluster
significantly ruptures. For both parents, family clustering has
increasingly adjusted to accommodate mobility, albeit imperfectly.
Under shared custody arrangements, one parent is often
designated the primary custodian (the “primary parent”) and the
other acts as the “secondary parent.” 110 Family law places essentially
no limits on the secondary parent’s mobility. For the secondary
104. See supra Part II.A.2.
105. Slusher v. Dep’t of Commerce, 354 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
106. Id.
107. See infra Part IV.A.
108. The issue of relocation may also arise at the initial custody determination, but this is
less common. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 94, at 720.
109. See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?: Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 113–17 (2007).
110. Id. at 115.
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parent, shared custody can be terminated at any time; he can move
and forego shared custody, perhaps even as a matter of constitutional
right. 111 Indeed, after the three-year mark, in about half of all joint
custody cases, physical custody ends up being exercised by only one
parent (typically the mother) substantially all the time. 112 Family
law’s only concern is the secondary parent’s satisfaction of any
alimony and child support obligations; it does not matter where the
secondary parent lives. 113 Indeed, the secondary parent can move
away and yet still have a court compel the primary parent to
accommodate communication and visitation with the child to
maintain the secondary parent’s relationship with the child. 114 In
other words, the secondary parent can still be part of the family
cluster from afar.
Even for the primary parent, family law clustering still provides
some leeway, and increasingly more so, to move and keep the
custodial situation—and thus the new family cluster of the primary
parent and the child—intact. When the primary parent wants to
relocate a substantial distance with the child and the secondary
parent objects, there is a question of whether the primary parent can
move without giving up custody of the child. About half the time a
court permits the primary parent to move with the child—most
frequently to support the two most accepted reasons for longdistance moves: employment sorting (i.e., to pursue an employment
opportunity for the primary parent or a new spouse) and clustering
of another family unit (i.e., remarriage). 115 Indeed, in recent decades,
standards for custody relocation have liberalized, 116 further
facilitating mobility of the primary parent. 117 Even when the primary
111. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective,
34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 67–80 (1995).
112. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 112–13 (1992).
113. See Holder v. Polaski, 544 A.2d 852, 854–56 (N.J. 1988) (noting that “in many
instances, the mother still receives custody of the children, and the father is awarded visitation
rights,” and that “[i]mplicit in that arrangement is the right of the father to move elsewhere
for virtually any reason”).
114. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 94, at 722.
115. See Glennon, supra note 109, at 123–26.
116. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 94, at 722. Custody relocation law varies by state, as
does its liberalization. Notably, California has recently retrenched to allow less mobility for
primary custodians. See In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (granting physical
custody to father if mother relocated because of the impact the move would have on the
children’s tenuous relationship with their father).
117. Statutory reforms making it easier to enforce support orders across state lines have
also facilitated the primary parent’s mobility. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and

1188

1165

Mobility Measures

parent is permitted to move, family law still tries to retain some of
the integrity of the former cluster. In such cases, a court may order
the primary parent to defray the costs of maintaining the secondary
parent’s relationship with the child (e.g., the costs associated with
visitation) as a condition of relocation. 118
The privileged view of employment sorting, as well as the
underclustering feature of family law, are manifest in courts’ varied
treatment of relocation requests depending on the reason for
relocation. A sizeable number of relocation cases address a primary
parent’s request to move closer to extended family and friends. 119
Parents seeking relocation have cited the economic, emotional, and
caregiving support that these relationships would provide. 120 But
some courts nonetheless express skepticism about moving to be near
extended family, 121 and others gloss over or downplay the benefits of
relocating to be near this extended network of intimates. 122 For
example, one court, rejecting a mother’s request to move where
both sets of her children’s grandparents lived, denied the relevance
of proximity to these relations, stating that the “family may assist
them financially and morally wherever they may live.” 123 In other
words, for grandparents, visits are enough.
This sort of skepticism is especially marked in contrast with
courts’ generally easy acceptance of family clustering 124 or
employment sorting 125 reasons for relocation. For example, one
court underscored the importance of mobility to cluster with the
new family by describing a mother’s request to relocate to remarry as
“the most normal desire in the world.” 126 The skeptical view of

Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673, 680 (2008) (noting that some version of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act is the law in all states).
118. See, e.g., Walrath v. Pope, 681 S.E.2d 602, 606 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (approving
visitation schedule that required mother who relocated with children to reimburse father for
one airline ticket per month to visit children); In re Marriage of Condon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33
(Ct. App. 1998) (allowing mother to relocate with children when father’s visitation costs were
offset by reductions in child and spousal support obligations).
119. See Glennon, supra note 109, at 134.
120. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Bianco, No. B161654, 2004 WL 1303620 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 14, 2004).
121. See, e.g., Sill v. Sill, 228 S.W.3d 538 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
122. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Austin, No. 91,222, 2004 WL 720231, at *1 (Kan. Ct.
App. Apr. 2, 2004).
123. Sill, 228 S.W.3d at 543.
124. See, e.g., Arriaga v. Gambardella, No. FA990431585S, 2002 WL 31018577 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2002).
125. See, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 119 P.3d 1246 (Nev. 2005) (granting move for a job that
would pay a higher salary and would provide assistance in obtaining an advanced degree).
126. Arriaga, 2002 WL 31018577 at *4.
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moves to be nearer to extended family and friends expresses the
strength of family clustering and employment sorting and their
correlate: that we move long distance for the family cluster or for
employment, not for other relationships. Even when these other
relocations are permitted, 127 the parent must nonetheless overcome
the skepticism.
III. WELFARE EFFECTS OF MOBILITY MEASURES
Although the upside of mobility is typically in focus, the current
configuration of sorting and clustering means mobility often falls
short of this welfare-enhancing ideal. Long-distance mobility is a
much thicker social phenomenon with more significant welfare
effects than mobility measures currently cognize. So while mobility
can bring benefits, it also imposes costs that require consideration to
improve mobility’s overall welfare effects. The combination of
sorting and clustering imposes two types of costs discussed in turn
below: “relationship costs”—the loss of support of local strong ties
with intimates outside the family cluster—and “economic costs”—
the loss of productivity resulting from the loss of strong ties inside
and outside the workplace. Although it is difficult to calculate the
costs and benefits of sorting and clustering, there are reasons to
believe that information deficits and cognitive biases lead individuals
and employers to underestimate the costs of mobility under the
current regime, limiting their ability to reach welfare-maximizing
decisions.
A. Relationship Costs
Strong ties—our intimates—are enormously important in our
lives. They provide crucial support and care that help us get through
the day as well as emotional connections that provide richness and
texture to our lives. While all strong ties are important, local strong
ties, in particular, are best equipped to serve central relational
functions and are likely to fade from a distance.
1. The strength(s) of local strong ties
Sociologist Mark S. Granovetter made famous “the strength of
weak ties.” 128 Weaker ties can be helpful by linking together groups

127. The results of these cases are mixed. Compare In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d
81 (Cal. 2004) (denying relocation to be near extended family), with Tropea v. Tropea, 665
N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996) (allowing move to be near child’s grandparents and cousins).
128. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1360 (1973).
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of weaker ties and by transmitting simple information, for example,
about employment opportunities, across these groups. 129 This makes
weak ties particularly important for success in the market. But it is
strong ties that provide greater motivation and capacity to seek (and
give) the more involved forms of support that are necessary for
everyday functioning and for providing meaning in our lives. 130
Strong ties can perform these functions because, unlike weak ties,
these relationships are defined by reciprocity and trust, 131 and they
are interconnected (i.e., our close friends are friends with each
other). Compared with weak ties, strong ties provide a community
that can transmit the sensitive and complex information necessary for
care and emotional support. 132 Economists tend to think that these
community-level social resources enhance welfare not only for their
direct effects on utility, but also because they help address common
economic problems, for example, overcoming the free-rider problem
in providing public goods or creating trust between individuals in
the absence of explicit contracts. 133
Strong ties communicate feelings of love and value, and a sense
of “belong[ing] to a network of communication and mutual
obligation.” 134 In this way, close ties promote self-esteem and
happiness, as well as physical and mental health. 135 And close ties are
central to defining who we are: ongoing strong ties help maintain
“the continuity of our identity through different life stages and
substantial life challenges.” 136
Strong ties play a critical role in supporting caregiving. In a
129. Id.
130. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1
SOC. THEORY 201, 209–13 (1983); Barry Wellman, The Community Question: The Intimate
Networks of East Yorkers, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1201, 1222–23 (1979).
131. See Granovetter, supra note 128, at 1361 (explaining that tie strength turns on “the
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal
services which characterize the tie”). This has been described as the “transitivity” of strong ties.
That is, “If Adam and Betty are close friends, and Betty and Charlie are close friends, then it is
also likely that Adam and Charlie are close friends. See Damon Centola & Michael Macy,
Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties, 113 AM. J. SOC. 702, 704 (2007).
132. See Granovetter, supra note 130, at 218 (explaining that strong ties enhance speed
of flow, credibility, and influence of information).
133. See Edward Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J.
F437, F437 (2002).
134. Leib, supra note 98, at 655 (quoting Sidney Cobb, Social Support as a Moderator of
Life Stress, 38 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 300 (1976)).
135. See Takeo Fujiwara & Ichiro Kawachi, Social Capital and Health: A Study of Adult
Twins in the U.S., 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 139 (2008) (finding that social capital (i.e.,
strong ties) promoted welfare using a sample of twins to control for outside effects).
136. Leib, supra note 98, at 655 (noting that strong ties serve as a bulwark against poor
health outcomes, from lower mental health to shorter life spans).
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typical week, the majority of children under five years old are in
some type of childcare arrangement, such as care by extended family,
daycare, nursery school, or other paid caregivers. 137 Beyond paid
care, caregivers rely extensively on extended family and friends for
providing care to children, the elderly, and the disabled. 138 By
providing support when public services are overextended, strong ties
“enhance both efficiency and community.” 139 Beyond caregiving
support, strong ties also provide caregivers an outlet from the
pressures of domestic life.
Strong-tie support is particularly salient for certain populations.
Supportive strong ties play a greater role in communities with fewer
resources and for those with less support within the family cluster—
single parents. 140 In part because women do more carework than
men, and because women are more likely to be single parents,
women rely more on strong ties than men. 141 Compared with men,
women have larger strong-tie networks. 142 The parties receiving
care—often children—benefit enormously from strong ties outside
the family cluster, including stable connections to extended family,
teachers, and peers. 143 And while the support provided by strong ties
is undoubtedly crucial for members of the domestic family, for those
who are single, the absence of a single legally and socially designated
point person to meet material and emotional needs may render a
network of strong ties still more essential.
Strong ties from a distance wither into weak ties or nonlocal
strong ties—what is left after a long-distance move. Physical
137. Murray, supra note 95, at 390–91.
138. Id. at 391–92.
139. Allan Silver, Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and
Modern Sociology, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1474, 1495 (1990) (citing MARTIN BULMER, NEIGHBORS:
THE WORK OF PHILIP ABRAMS (1986)); see also Granovetter, supra note 130, at 212–13.
140. See Murray, supra note 95, at 391–93 (explaining how caregiving networks may be
particularly significant for single parents and in African-American, Latino, immigrant, and gay
and lesbian communities); Granovetter, supra note 130, at 211–13; see generally CAROL
STACK, ALL OUR KIN (1974) (describing how close ties are essential for daily survival in the
inner city).
141. See Margaret Brinig, The Division of Labor Across Time and Generations, in
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth Scott eds., forthcoming
2012); Isabel Dyck, Mother or Worker? Women’s Support Networks, Local Knowledge and
Informal Child Care Strategies, in WHO WILL MIND THE BABY? GEOGRAPHIES OF CHILD
CARE AND WORKING MOTHERS 132–33, 135 (Kim England ed., 1996).
142. See Toni C. Antonucci & Hiroko Akiyama, An Examination of Sex Differences in
Social Support Among Older Men and Women, 17 SEX ROLES 737, 737 (1987) (finding that as
compared with married men, who tend to rely on their spouses exclusively, married women
tend to receive support from multiple sources outside the domestic family).
143. See Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern
Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 9–12 (1998).
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proximity is important to providing and receiving care and support
from strong ties. Many of our most basic needs can only be met with
in-person contact: transporting people or goods, providing food or
other items when one is ill, and meeting the everyday needs of
children or the elderly. Emotional support is often better provided
through in-person contact, when a person can watch reactions and
respond in kind. 144 The joys of social connection, too, can often best
be appreciated through in-person contact, by sharing a meal across
from someone at the table, or by engaging in activities. Indeed, the
stronger the tie, the more likely the person will provide support, 145
and stronger ties tend to live nearer to one another. 146 Assistance and
frequency of contact increase when people are within close
geographic range. 147 And beyond the significance of physically
proximate individual ties, there are institutions—schools, daycare
centers, and nursing homes—for which proximity matters.
Despite the increasing influence of technology in allowing people
to maintain faraway relationships, many features of the closeness of a
relationship are still associated with geographic proximity. The value
of strong ties in providing caregiving support, particularly for
everyday or emergency needs, is largely lost when the caregiving
network is not geographically close. While nonlocal strong ties may
still play a significant role in providing emotional support,
technology is not a substitute for physical proximity. Despite e-mail,
Facebook, Twitter, and long-distance phone calls, distance still
weakens relationships. 148 While the Internet helps to maintain
contact with distant and weak ties, relationships’ sensitivity to
distance is similar pre- and post-Internet, and the most active ties are
still nearby. 149 Technology has made it easier to find more
customized ties, for instance, an online support group for a rare
medical condition or an eBay seller, but these ties are often

144. Face-to-face contact may be important for emotional contagion (i.e., to feel what
those around us are feeling) which allows us to relate more fully to those near us. See Elizabeth
F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 93
GEO. L.J. 399, 435–38 (2006) (explaining how emotional contagion operates through inperson contact).
145. Wellman, supra note 130, at 1222–23.
146. See Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of the Internet?, 47 URB.
STUD. 2747, 2750 (2010) (citing studies reporting that large percentages of strong ties live
near each other).
147. Wellman, supra note 130, at 1219–22.
148. Mok, supra note 146, at 2750, 2778 (explaining that the telephone and the internet
tend to “work synergistically with face-to-face contact” to supplement rather than replace it,
and that e-mail frequently serves to arrange visits and telephone calls).
149. Id. at 2775, 2779–80.
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weaker. 150 Facebook and other “friendships” maintained through
new technology have little in common with true friendship: they are
devoid of the intimacy that is the hallmark of a strong interpersonal
bond. 151
Nonetheless, there can be too much of a good thing when it
comes to local strong ties. Because reciprocity is a hallmark of strong
ties, strong ties often mean not just more support, but more
demands as well. 152 Over-reliance on strong ties may be harmful to
low-income populations, who are burdened by these strong ties and
less likely to develop the weak ties that are helpful in the labor
market. 153 Just as women disproportionately rely on strong-tie
support, so too do excessive strong-tie demands disproportionately
burden women. Strong ties may also burden beyond obligations,
with mobility as a corrective. Escaping strong ties can mean an
escape from restrictive norms, for example, an abusive relationship,
or a community that rejects gays and lesbians, and an opportunity to
develop more accepting strong ties. 154
At the same time, several features of strong ties buffer against
overburdening. There are returns to scale from strong ties, which
caregivers may exploit by forming shared daycare and babysitting
schemes. 155 Interconnections between strong ties also spread the
costs of monitoring so that each member need not be constantly
vigilant about other members’ needs. Moreover, support received
and support given is not zero-sum. Providing support to strong ties
brings utility to the supporter, 156 at least partially offsetting the
depleting effects of demands. Even when demands are high,
knowing that strong ties will reciprocate may be a source of
camaraderie and comfort.
Weighing the benefits and burdens of local strong ties is a
150. Avery M. Guest & Susan K. Wierzbicki, Social Ties at the Neighborhood Level: Two
Decades of GSS Evidence, 35 URB. AFF. REV. 92, 96, 108 (1999).
151. See SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM
TECHNOLOGY AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER (2011); William Deresiewicz, Faux Friendship,
CHRON. REV., Dec. 6, 2009, at 9, available at http://chronicle.com/article/FauxFriendship/49308. Skype makes greater inroads on seeing and talking to faraway ties.
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. See Portes, supra note 143, at 14–15.
154. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000)
(explaining how mobility was used to escape bad marriages before liberalized divorce laws).
The post-Reconstruction Great Migration of African-Americans was a means to escape the Jim
Crow South and seek greater freedoms in the North. See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE
WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
155. Elder care is less apt to benefit from these economies of scale.
156. See Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness, 319
SCI. 1687, 1688 (2008).
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difficult proposition. Strong ties and weak ties are complements, not
substitutes, 157 and success in personal and market-based pursuits
requires some mix of the two. My goal is not to argue that mobility
measures should preserve local strong ties above all else or to
pinpoint the precise circumstances that make mobility worthwhile,
but to highlight the thickness of the social phenomenon of longdistance mobility and the costs that mobility measures fail to
acknowledge. I return to these concerns in Part IV, where I consider
modifications to mobility measures to account for these costs.
2. Mobility measures and relationship costs
Because local strong ties are geographically sensitive, longdistance moves will result in the fraying of strong ties outside the
family cluster. Mobility measures impose relationship costs in the
form of lost local strong ties in two ways. Employment sorting
means that we move away from local strong ties, and family
clustering does not provide sufficient cushioning from these lost ties.
The relationship costs generated by mobility measures can be
categorized into two types: costs from the loss of strong ties outside
the family cluster, and costs on the family cluster itself.

157. See supra notes 128–43 and accompanying text describing the different functions of
strong and weak ties.
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a. Sorting and local strong ties. Mobility measures encourage the
loss of local strong ties outside the nuclear family. Employment
sorting ruptures strong ties because long-distance moves are
motivated by employment instead of proximity to strong ties. While
it is difficult to assess from the available relocation data, which does
not account for moves due to multiple factors, 158 employmentmotivated moves will, by and large, be moves away from strong ties.
As an initial matter, strong ties will typically be strongest in the place
where an individual or family has been living for a while. This means
that a move away from a domicile of any significant duration will
likely also be a move away from strong ties. The exception might be
frequent sorting, in which case the sorter may have been unlikely to
develop strong ties in the location she is leaving. To the extent that
individuals limit sorting to locations where they have at least some
strong ties, the impact of lost strong ties will be mitigated, but not
eliminated. The long-distance move still requires leaving established
relationships and routines, and reestablishing relationships and
routines, both with personal and market-based strong ties.
Long-distance sorting imposes the loss of strong ties outside the
family cluster, with the concomitant loss of care and support benefits
these strong ties provide. 159 A long-distance move places the mover
in a position of having only weak ties in the new location, at least for
a while. Unlike weak ties, strong ties “build slowly and incrementally
over time,” 160 requiring significant investments to rebuild. The
longer the move, the more challenging the replacement of strong
ties will be, because the mover will be less likely to have connections
in the new location. 161 And even if strong ties can be rebuilt, they are
not fungible. Beyond the unique connections we have with extended
family and close friends, market-based care providers also develop
unique relationships with those for whom they care, and are not
easily replaceable. Repeated long-distance moves multiply the loss of
local strong ties, as well as the efforts to rebuild them, and
expectations of mobility in fact reduce investment in valuable strongtie networks. 162 The very mobile, such as military families, may

158. The census only allows one category to be selected as the reason for a move.
159. See Portes, supra note 143, at 11 (“Leaving a community tends to destroy
established bonds, thus depriving [the movers] of a major source of social capital.”); supra
notes 137–143 and accompanying text on the benefits of strong ties.
160. Daniel J. Brass et al., Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network
Perspective, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 14, 17 (1998).
161. See ELLICKSON, supra note 8, at 29 (addressing the greater relationship costs of
long-distance moves).
162. Glaeser et al., supra note 133, at F439 (finding that mobility reduces social capital
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simply forego investing in ties that will soon be lost. 163
Moreover, long-distance sorting causes not only the loss of
strong ties to the movers, but also the loss of movers to the strong
ties, which imposes costs that are difficult for the movers to
internalize. 164 Because it takes time to rebuild strong ties in the new
community, the gain to the new community is not symmetrical with
the loss to the departed community. The loss may be especially large
when a long-distance mover has extensive caregiving obligations to
someone outside the family cluster, for example, an ailing parent,
who is left behind. Outside the FMLA, which provides leave to care
for a parent, family law does not recognize this type of caregiving. 165
So even if the long-distance sorter brings along a parent to a nursing
home in the new location, mobility measures do nothing to facilitate
this extra-nuclear-family clustering.
Although family law traditionally regulates the social
relationships in our lives, 166 employment law is also part of the story.
While a long-distance sorting move leads to lost ties, the loss of these
ties is considered a personal matter and is given no accounting by
mobility measures. Enabling employment laws exist precisely to
minimize linkages between employees and any particular employer or
workplace, with no consideration for local strong ties. To the extent
that facilitating laws—such as the Trade Act, tax deduction, and UI
benefits—take into account lost social support upon a move, they do
so only by providing relocation subsidies for the domestic family,
replicating the underclustering of family law. While UI’s clustering
subsidy acknowledges the more significant cost of the clustering
spouse’s lost income, this loss is still related to employment and not
social support.
Employment sorting laws fail to account for features of longreturns and thus investment in social capital).
163. See PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY
FAMILIES: MEETING AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 15–20 (2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_initiative/strengthening_our_military_
january_2011.pdf (discussing a government initiative to address the costs of repeated sorting
by military families).
164. Glaeser et al., supra note 133, at F439, F441, F450 (noting that mobility imposes
lost social capital in the community departed).
165. See Weickert v. Weickert, 602 S.E.2d 337, 340–41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (shifting
custody to father after mother relocated from Georgia to California to care for her elderly
parents); supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
166. See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 36
(2006) (“Family law . . . comprises those sets of laws (1) whose purpose is to regulate
relationships among intimates, or (2) whose operation hinges on the existence of a certain
family status or relationship.”).
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distance sorting that exacerbate its relationship costs. Sorting laws
typically do not consider the sorter’s likely duration in the new
location, which means they fail to check the most costly form of
long-distance sorting: repeated mobility. 167 Nor do sorting subsidies
apply to moves to return to a location where strong ties already exist,
unless these moves would independently meet the employmentrelated requirements. So, for example, if a spouse received UI
benefits for a long-distance sorting move, and the couple wanted to
return to their initial location (where they had a network of strong
ties), the couple would receive these benefits only if one of the
spouses had a qualifying job in the new location. Finally,
employment-sorting laws fail to consider the magnitude of distance,
even though longer moves are generally more costly in terms of lost
strong ties. Sorting laws’ only consideration of distance is a floor—
typically, reasonable commuting distance.
Women, who rely more than men on strong ties,
disproportionately bear the relationship costs that mobility measures
ignore. 168 So mobility measures that facilitate only the mobility of
the family cluster are more likely to allow men’s primary source of
support to accompany them. And for single mothers, the only strong
ties that are part of the family cluster are their children. Women also
spend more time than men developing and attending to the family
cluster’s strong-tie network, including the ties of parents and
children. 169 This means that the loss of strong ties disproportionately
imposes a loss to women’s resources, and that the work of rebuilding
a strong-tie network disproportionately imposes a tax on them.
b. Clustering and local strong ties. The loss of local strong ties
upon a long-distance sorting move impacts the meaning of the
family cluster, both for nuclear families and for singles. Viewing
mobility measures in a dynamic fashion, mobility measures create a
positive feedback loop that further strengthens the family cluster and
weakens other strong ties. As people move to sort and cluster with

167. An exception is the Trade Act, under which a worker is eligible for relocation
assistance only with an offer of “employment affording a reasonable expectation of long-term
duration.” 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a)(2) (2006).
168. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
169. See Marybeth J. Mattingly & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Gender Differences in the
Quantity and Quality of Free Time: The U.S. Experience, 81 SOC. FORCES 999, 1001 (2003)
(discussing women’s role as “the coordinators of family life” and their “activities on behalf of
other family members . . . in building and maintaining social relationships and kinship ties”);
see also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 35 (1989).
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their family units, their connections to other strong ties weaken, and
they become increasingly dependent on the family cluster. As
dependence on the family cluster intensifies, connections to others
wither, making another move still more likely, and so on. In this
way, mobility measures reinforce a hierarchy of strong ties that
privileges the family cluster over other ties.
This positive feedback loop intensifies domestic family
relationships. Reduction of strong-tie support in one form—
community strong ties—is partially compensated by an increase in
strong-tie support in another form—familial support. 170 From 1985
to 2004, Americans reported a marked decline in the number of
people with whom they discussed meaningful matters. 171 People
reported fewer close relationships with coworkers, extended family
members, neighbors, and friends. 172 The family cluster has picked up
the slack. Marriage was the only close relationship in which more
people discussed important matters in 2004 than in 1985. 173 The
number of people who depended entirely on a spouse for important
conversations nearly doubled, from 5% to almost 10%. 174 As
Professor Stephanie Coontz has written: “As Americans lose the
wider face-to-face ties that build social trust, they become more
dependent on romantic relationships for intimacy and deep
communication, and more vulnerable to isolation if a relationship
breaks down.” 175
Mobility measures may contribute to these dynamics. Providing
for the portability of the family cluster but not other strong ties robs
the family of support that helps it endure stressful events, and places
more pressure on the spouses to compensate for the loss of those
ties. This pressure may undermine the family cluster by
overburdening the marital relationship—so much so that the cluster
unravels.
By failing to provide for strong-tie support to join singles on a
long-distance move, mobility measures impose relationship costs on
singles. This may make sorting easier, as a single person only needs
to consider one set of employment needs. 176 This is born out in data

170. See Portes, supra note 143, at 11–12.
171. Miller McPherson et al., Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion
Networks over Two Decades, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 353, 353–54 (2006).
172. Id. at 358–59.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 359.
175. Stephanie Coontz, Op-Ed., Too Close for Comfort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at
A21.
176. Even those with children will have little limit on long-distance sorting except in the
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that younger people, who are more likely to be single, move more. 177
The flip side is that the single person’s most intimate relations will
likely not come along. Mobility measures’ failure to acknowledge
singles’ need for strong-tie support upon a move is still more salient
given that today “emerging adulthood” is growing, and many
Americans marry later (or not at all). 178
As friendship is given no accounting in mobility measures, it is
not surprising that, even for singles, friends tend not to cluster over
long distances. 179 Any person who moves to be nearer a friend risks
that the friend, who herself will be subject to sorting and clustering
dynamics, will up and move for a job, a marriage, or a spouse’s job.
But even a proponent of the legal recognition of friendship, Ethan
Leib, notes that “[t]he fact that many friendships dwindle . . . is not
necessarily the symptom of a flawed friendship,” but rather a
reflection of the fact that “[p]eople move away, get married, have
kids, . . . change jobs.”180 Leib takes the sensitivity of friendship to
moves, job changes, and marriages as a given, rather than assessing
the impact of law. While preferences and social norms undoubtedly
play a role in these friendship dynamics, so too do mobility measures.
B. Economic Costs
Employment sorting and the mobile labor market are prized for
the efficiency gains they promise. 181 To be sure, a geographically
flexible labor market has been credited with lower unemployment
rates, better labor-market matching and associated economic growth,
and greater incentives for human capital investment. 182 But this does
case of an objecting secondary parent, see supra notes 115–18, and even then, a move will
often be permitted, see supra Part II.B.2.b.
177. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 3.
178. Robin Marantz Henig, The Post-Adolescent, Pre-Adult, Not-Quite-Decided Life
Stage, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 22, 2010, at 28, 30.
179. Friends and roommates are not categories of reasons for moves on the census. See
SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 12.
180. Leib, supra note 98, at 681 n.260.
181. See Leon H. Keyserling, The New Deal and Its Current Significance in re National
Economic and Social Policy, 59 WASH. L. REV. 795, 801 (1984) (explaining that the sorting
regime created by employment law is aimed at sustained optimal production and economic
growth).
182. See supra notes 30–35. Note, however, that there is modest disagreement among
economists even on topics related to this point, which is captured, for example, in questions
about “place prosperity” versus “people prosperity,” and whether governments should invest
in declining areas. Compare Robert Bolton, Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity Revisited: An
Old Issue with a New Angle, 29 URB. STUD. J. 185 (1992) (advocating for place-based
investment based on the value of “sense of place”), with Edward Glaeser & Charles Redlick,
Social Capital and Urban Growth, 32 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 264 (2009) (arguing that in
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not mean that sorting is an unmitigated good. As an initial matter,
involuntary sorting necessitated by job loss can pose economic harm
to employees. Still further, even for purely voluntary sorting, the
economic consequences of long-distance sorting are more
complicated. 183 Strong workplace ties, as well as the strong social ties
discussed above, are a key part of individual and firm productivity,
but they are not portable. The economic consequences of workplace
and social strong-tie losses require consideration so that employment
sorting can be optimized.
1. Local workplace ties and productivity
The conventional narrative of the benefits of sorting tends to
focus narrowly on the wage benefits the employee accrues at the time
of the job switch, and the gains the employer accrues at the time of
hiring the new employee. 184 But returns to job tenure as compared
with interfirm mobility may be higher than previously thought, and
the role of workplace strong ties in enhancing productivity is likely a
significant reason for this. 185
Strong ties promote worker productivity in a number of ways.
Strong workplace ties provide access to information, which in turn
brings access to power and opportunities, and the ability to
coordinate complicated projects, all of which enhance
performance. 186 Strong ties also contribute to resource sharing,
theory, place-based investments are worthwhile if people are less likely to invest in social capital
when they know an area is declining, but that the data show little evidence that decline is
accompanied by lower social capital investment). Place-based investment is the minority
position. See id. at 264.
183. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structure As An Independent Variable in Assessing Stock
Market Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547, 556 (2004) (citing relevant studies).
184. See Sylvia Fuller, Job Mobility and Wage Trajectories for Men and Women in the
United States, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 158, 159 (2008) (“[T]he literature on the effect of mobility
on wages concentrates on the short-term effects . . . .”).
185. See Moshe Buchinsky et al., Interfirm Mobility, Wages and the Returns to Seniority
and Experience in the United States, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 972 (2010) (finding that the
economic benefits of labor mobility may be overstated); Lyman Johnson, Individual and
Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2230 (1992)
(discussing how economic activity productivity must be viewed within the context of social
relations, and how “social relations themselves may influence the relative efficiency of . . .
various courses of action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KEVIN J. DELANEY,
STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY, 56 (1992)).
186. See Noah E. Friedkin, Informational Flow Through Strong and Weak Ties in
Intraorganizational Social Networks, 3 SOC. NETWORKS 273, 281 (1982) (addressing role of
strong ties in conveying information in the workplace); Nancy B. Kurland & Lisa Hope Pelled,
Passing the Word: Toward a Model of Gossip and Power in the Workplace, 25 ACAD. MGMT.

1201

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

which promotes productivity, innovation, and entrepreneurship. 187
Moreover, strong workplace ties are positively associated with
affective commitment to the firm, which increases organizational
citizenship behavior, firm loyalty, and willingness to give back to the
firm. 188 Strong workplace ties, in the form of close friends and even
“work wives” also provide emotional support and care that can
contribute to performance. 189 In short, employees with strong
workplace ties “are more efficient than their peers, suffer less stress at
the office, tend to stay at their jobs longer, and experience less job
dissatisfaction.” 190
Strong workplace ties are perhaps even less portable than
community ties. Strong work ties are premised on coworker
relationships involving repeated interaction in the workplace. 191 In
the context of long-distance moves, not only will strong workplace
ties no longer be coworkers, but they will also fall out of the mover’s
local professional circle. Upon starting work in the second location,
new employees, and especially those who move from afar, are
considered “outsiders” who do not have the legitimacy to reap the
benefits of strong ties. 192 So the loss of strong workplace ties makes it
REV. 428, 431–32 (2000) (discussing how passing workplace gossip among trusted strong ties
can confer power); Jone L. Pearce & Amy E. Randel, Expectations of Organizational Mobility,
Workplace Social Inclusion, and Employee Job Performance, 25 J. ORG. BEHAVIOR 81, 86
(2004) (noting that individuals with central positions in their work group’s advice network
earn better performance ratings); see also Centola & Macy, supra note 131, at 707, 709–10
(When “collective behaviors involve complex contagions that require social affirmation or
reinforcement from multiple sources,” the redundancy of strong ties “becomes an essential
pathway for diffusion.”).
187. See Portes, supra note 143, at 3–4, 12.
188. See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 95–96 (2004) (discussing the importance of
affective commitment and extra-role behavior, known as organizational citizenship behavior, in
productivity); Pearce & Randel, supra note 186, at 85 (explaining that strong ties lead
employees to be more committed to the organization, more willing to work flexibly, more
likely to subordinate their own goals to the organization’s needs and invest in firm-specific
skills and knowledge, and more open to cost reduction and other organizational changes).
189. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 24 (2003) (“Working adults have more . . .
conversations about things they consider important with co-workers than with anyone outside
of their families.”); Sue Shellenbarger, Do You Have a Work Spouse?, WSJ.COM (Feb. 8, 2011,
10:16
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2011/02/08/do-you-have-a-work-spouse
(reporting that in a survey of 640 white-collar workers, “[n]early two-thirds of workers have,
or have had, a ‘work spouse’—a close co-worker of the opposite sex who shares confidences,
loyalties and experiences”).
190. ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND
WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 40 (2011).
191. See Shellenbarger, supra note 189 (explaining that this interaction can span intimate
subjects as well as office talk).
192. See Ronald S. Burt, The Gender of Social Capital, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 5, 24
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harder to perform optimally in the new workplace, over at least the
medium-term, until an employee can rebuild strong ties.
Performance costs associated with the lack of strong ties are
amplified with more frequent mobility. 193
Firms suffer not only because their long-distance sorted
employees are without their strong workplace ties, but also because
strongly tied employees collectively create networks with co-workers,
customers, contractors, and consultants that benefit the firm. These
networks allow firms to develop structurally embedded relations,
which consist of an intricate web of routinized transactions that
reduce transaction costs, saving time and money. 194 Employment
sorting imposes the loss of a departing employee’s relationships and
routines, and affords their new employers the opportunity to
appropriate these routines. 195 These losses make employee turnover
and training costly for firms. 196 While a firm might still benefit from
its connections to a former employee, especially one who stays in the
same industry, through referrals and the like, these benefits diminish
when an employee is no longer in the firm’s local professional
community. 197 Moreover, the hiring of an “outsider,” especially one
from far away who likely has no ties in the workplace, may
undermine trust in the new firm. 198
Employment sorting laws may themselves create expectations
about the need to be mobile that undermine the motivation to
develop strong workplace ties, and, in turn, individual and
organizational productivity. 199 Employees who anticipate longdistance sorting will invest comparatively less in building strong ties
in the workplace and in a location where they do not plan to remain
and will place less importance on job tasks that are not consistent
(1998).
193. Jeanne M. Brett, Job Transfer and Well-Being, 67 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 450, 457
(1982).
194. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985); Frank P. Romo & Michael Schwartz, The
Structural Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The Migration of Manufacturing Plants in New
York State, 1960 to 1985, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 874, 879 (1995); Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and
Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 41–
42 (1997).
195. See Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Preserving Human Capital: Using the Noncompete
Agreement to Achieve Competitive Advantage, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 32829 (2011).
196. See id. at 326–29; Buchinsky et al., supra note 185, at 975.
197. See Bolton, supra note 182, at 193–94 (discussing altruism and trust that arises in
local labor markets).
198. Burt, supra note 192, at 24.
199. See id. at 19; Portes, supra note 143, at 6.
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with their expectations for mobility. 200 So if an employee plans to
move, she might not spend as much time chatting by the water
cooler, even though this could build coworker trust that would aid
in completing future projects.
2. Local social ties and productivity
The loss of strong social ties and the pressure on the family
cluster that result from the current regime of sorting and clustering
also hinder productivity, thus interfering with the economic goals of
mobility measures. Issues regarding strong-tie social support—“self
and spouse losing social ties, moving away from family and friends,
and establishing new relationships at work”—have been reported as
the most stressful aspects of a work-related move. 201 The loss of these
strong ties, and the stress associated with it, can affect an employee’s
ability to acclimate to a new workplace and perform well there. 202
For married couples, the family cluster is the only cushion for the
spouse and her domestic family. For others, this means potentially all
strong ties are lost.
Lost strong social ties impose opportunity costs for productivity.
More time must be spent arranging for and providing care than on
other productive work. This is hard enough with commercial care
arrangements. But certain forms of care that are more difficult to
purchase—care for a sick child, after-hours care—might fall directly
on parents who have not yet established strong ties to help in a
pinch. 203 This makes balancing work and family even more difficult
after a long-distance move, sometimes at the expense of work. 204
For those moving with others, productivity may suffer due to the
consequences of the move on other members of the family cluster.
The stress of relocation is much greater for individuals whose spouses
need to find jobs in the new location. 205 Those who move alone, on
200. Cf. Kurland & Pelled, supra note 186, at 435–36.
201. Anthony G. Munton, Job Relocation, Stress and the Family, 11 J. ORG. BEHAV. 401,
405 (1990).
202. See id.; Brett, supra note 193, at 452; Peter Pardine et al., Job-Stress Worker-Strain
Relationship Moderated by Off-The-Job Experience, 48 PSYCHOL. REP. 963, 968 (1981).
203. See Joan E. Starker, Psychosocial Aspects of Geographic Relocation: The Development of
a New Social Network, AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 52, 52 (1990) (finding minimal social
support months after a move).
204. See Martha Wiggins Frame & Constance L. Shehan, Work and Well-Being in the
Two-Person Career, 43 FAM. REL. 196, 196 (1994) (discussing how relocation stress increases
with the pile-up of demands associated with a move, with a greater negative impact on wives
than husbands).
205. Munton, supra note 201, at 403.
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the other hand, may be particularly affected by the loss of strong-tie
support the move induces. For singles, a long-distance sorting move
will mean that at least initially they may be without any local strong
ties. This lack of support can lead to feelings of isolation that
interfere with work productivity. 206 Moreover, the lack of strong ties
may mean that a transplanted single person will want to invest
additional time and energy building strong bonds. But she may have
a hard time balancing this desire with work demands, because time
to develop friendships and even date (the gateway to marriage, after
all), is generally not considered a legitimate reason for work
flexibility (even less so than caregiving). 207
3. Mobility measures and economic costs
To the extent that sorting causes economic costs for longdistance movers, relocation subsidies and benefits are meant to offset
these costs. But the costs employment sorting laws offset are aimed
at the tangible costs at the initial sorting moment—relocation
expenses for the individual and the family, the portability of health
insurance, and partial wage replacement for a spouse. There is little
consideration of longer-term economic costs for employees and
employers in terms of lost strong workplace ties. Sorting laws fail to
consider factors that exacerbate the economic costs of long-distance
sorting: frequency of mobility, distance of move (other than creating
a floor), and whether there are strong ties in the destination
location. 208 And the cushion that family law provides to insure
against strong-tie losses—the family cluster—fails to insure against all
of the local strong-tie losses that matter for productivity. For
example, despite the significance of workplace relationships, the law
treats work spouses (and other strong workplace ties) and legal
spouses in opposite manners—one is switched as a function of
sorting, and the other is maintained as a function of clustering. The
failure to recognize important workplace relationships is both cause
and effect of the mobile employee: because these relationships are
not recognized, employees have an easier time sorting, and as
206. See Peter H. Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
865, 888 (2008) (noting how co-locating family members can support a worker’s productivity
upon a move); Starker, supra note 203, at 52 (finding lack of support and isolation after a
move).
207. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why, And How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1753, 1766–67 (2001) (discussing perceptions of caregiving as more significant than
other employee interests).
208. See supra Part III.A.2.
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employees increasingly sort, these relationships are further weakened.
In these ways, sorting and clustering fail to account for the loss of
strong ties bound up in relationships outside the family cluster, the
investments necessary to rebuild these strong ties, and the impact
this has on productivity. 209
While lost strong workplace and social ties impose real economic
costs, stasis can breed stagnation. New ties can inspire new ways of
thinking. 210 Groups that are too tightly knit may exclude outsiders,
which may make it harder for long-distance sorters to integrate into
the firm. 211 My point, then, is not that mobility undermines
productivity writ large, but that there are underappreciated costs of
mobility that could be better addressed by the legal regime of sorting
and clustering.
C. Sorting and Clustering Decisions
Determining when long-distance sorting is welfare maximizing is
a difficult proposition. Heterogeneity in the role of strong ties in
people’s lives and in whether any particular move brings the movers
closer to or further from beneficial or burdensome ties means that
the benefit-burden calculus must often proceed on a case-by-case
basis. Individuals likely have the best information about the welfare
effects of strong ties and mobility on their lives. Nonetheless, people
have been known to err in predicting the welfare effects of their
decisions. 212 And there are reasons to believe that employees and
employers systematically err in weighing the costs and benefits of
long-distance mobility due to cognitive biases and information
deficits that lead to overestimating the benefits of mobility and
underestimating its costs.
On the employee side, optimism bias—the tendency to be overly
optimistic about the outcome of our actions 213—combined with
focalism—the tendency to focus on the main event rather than
background details that are equally or more significant 214—lead

209. See Burt, supra note 192, at 11.
210. Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class, 2 CITY & CMTY. 3, 6 (2003).
211. See Burt, supra note 192, at 15 (discussing the link between ties and workplace
success and the challenges outsiders face at work).
212. David A. Armor & Shelley E Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (finding optimism bias in a range of
contexts).
213. Id.; Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 806, 806 (1980).
214. See David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education,
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people to overestimate their ability to bring about personally
desirable events, because they fail to correct for unknown or
unpredictable details of future situations, even though those details
matter a lot. 215 The variety of unknown and unpredictable details
upon a long-distance move, including those related to a new job and
a new community, among others, may tend to lead to undue
optimism about long-distance sorting moves. 216
These biases may be further skewed in the case of long-distance
sorting due to salience bias and weighting errors—the tendency to
weigh concrete and easily comparable factors more heavily than
diffuse and incommensurable factors. 217 In the mobility context, this
means that people might value the more concrete employment gains
derived from long-distance sorting (salary, title, etc.) than the more
abstract losses (changes in personal relationships, etc.). 218 These
types of weighting errors are observed with the commuter paradox,
which is the label for the substantially welfare-reducing decisions
people make about commuting, due to overvaluing the concrete
benefits of positional goods such as a larger house, as compared with
the diffuse losses of nonpositional goods such as traffic-induced
aggravation. 219 Given similar trade-offs between positional and
nonpositional goods at stake in the mobility context, similar
weighting errors might be expected to compromise sorting decisions.
Hedonics research shows that these types of weighting errors can
seriously undermine welfare calculations, because it is nonpositional
goods like spending time with strong ties (precisely what we lose
with a long-distance move) that have a greater impact on happiness
than making more money. 220 To be sure, there may be biases that

and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 69, 72, 77 (2004).
215. Id. at 76.
216. See id.
217. Salience bias means that people tend to focus on factors that are more prominent,
immediate, and easier to process. See Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing
Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 261–63 (2011).
218. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Values, Choices, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOL. 341, 344–46 (1984).
219. There is an observed tendency to overvalue positional goods like money and real
estate and undervalue nonpositional goods like social connections and walking to work. See
Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective WellBeing, 77 SOC. RES. INT’L Q. 679, 700–01 (2010). One Swiss study found that to move from
no commuting time to twenty-two minutes of commuting time (each way), an individual
requires an additional monthly income of approximately 470 Euros (or 35.4% of the average
monthly income) to compensate for lost welfare. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress that
Doesn’t Pay: The Commuting Paradox, 110 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 339, 355 (2008).
These are not the patterns observed. Id.
220. See Jon Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Lawsuits, 108
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cut the other way, e.g., the status quo bias, 221 but on balance, the
biases and weighting errors involved in mobility decision making
should at least give us pause about decisions in this area.
On the employer side, firms are also subject to limitations in
decision making, including biases and information deficits, that may
lead to suboptimal sorting-related decisions, including a failure to
appreciate the productivity costs associated with long-distance
sorting moves or the benefits of providing relocation
accommodations. Due to salience bias, job qualifications listed on a
resume and accessible in an interview will loom far larger than the
typically unknown factors of the ability of a long-distance sorting
employee (and her family) to adjust after a long-distance move. 222
Employers’ sorting-related decision making deficits may be especially
problematic in the context of social strong ties. Focalism means that
employers may wrongly pay little heed to what they consider
“personal” matters outside the scope of the employment
relationship. 223
Information asymmetries related to social strong ties also play a
role. 224 Employers may be reluctant to raise personal questions to
applicants or new hires that may cross professional and legal
boundaries. 225 This means that “boundedly rational” 226 managers are
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1527 & n.56 (citing the economist Richard Easterlin for findings about
“how quickly people adapt to increases in income due to concomitant changes in aspirations
and how slowly they adapt to nonpecuniary benefits like family life”).
In particular, people make decisions assuming that more income, comfort, and
positional goods will make them happier, failing to recognize that hedonic
adaptation and social comparison will come into play, raise their aspirations to about
the same extent as their actual gains, and leave them feeling no happier than before.
As a result, most individuals spend a disproportionate amount of their lives working
to make money, and sacrifice family life and health, domains in which aspirations
remain fairly constant as actual circumstances change, and where the attainment of
one’s goals has a more lasting impact on happiness. Hence, a reallocation of time in
favor of family life and health would, on average, increase individual happiness.
Id. at 1527 n.56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining
Happiness, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,176, 11,182 (2003)).
221. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1228–29 (2003).
222. See supra note 217.
223. See Schoenbaum, supra note 70, at 134.
224. Cf. J.H. Verkeke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (2003)
(discussing inefficient hiring decisions resulting from information asymmetries about employee
disabilities).
225. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(9) (2009) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . .
to request or require information from an employee . . . relating to . . . the individual’s familial
responsibilities . . . .”). Anti-discrimination law limits employers’ ability to inquire about
prospective employees’ personal circumstances. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 70, at 104,
133 (discussing these laws and their construction of the boundaries of the employment
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unlikely to have the information necessary to determine the costs of
hiring long-distance sorters for productivity and morale or the
benefits of providing relocation support for retention and
integration. 227 It also means that employers’ implementation of
efficient relocation support is largely dependent on individual
employee requests. 228 Not every employee who would benefit from
such support asks for it for fear that she will signal she is a “lemon”:
an employee who is overly involved with her personal life and not
fully committed to work. 229 Indeed, although in dual-income
families the clustering spouse’s work in the new location is critical to
family adjustment, in one study fewer than one-fifth of clustering
spouses reported that they received adequate support securing
employment from the sorting spouse’s employer. 230
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILITY MEASURES
For married couples, long-distance sorting moves typically
involve a relative distribution of sorting and clustering: one spouse
sorts, and one spouse clusters. The sorting spouse—whose
employment drives the move—benefits from sorting. While the
sorting spouse may go from strong ties to weak workplace ties, the
clustering spouse will go from strong to even weaker or perhaps no
workplace ties, without offsetting sorting benefits. At the same time
that the clustering spouse might not benefit from sorting, she might
also provide more of the cushioning the family cluster insures. These
distributional consequences fall along gender lines— husbands sort,
and wives cluster—and contribute to the unequal economic
circumstances of men and women, both inside and outside marriage.

relationship).
226. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) (explaining that “human rationality is normally bounded by
limited information and limited information processing”).
227. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between
Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081,
1102 (2010) (discussing this problem in the context of caregiving accommodations).
228. See id. at 1100.
229. See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958–59 (1996)
(discussing the problem of negative signaling in the context of requesting a just-cause
termination provision in an employment contract).
230. PERMITS FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF EXPATRIATE SPOUSES AND
PARTNERS
20–22
(Nov.
2009),
available
at
http://www.permitsfoundation.com/docs/permits_survey_final_report.pdf (finding in survey
of spouses on international assignment that those who worked were more likely to report a
positive impact on adjustment, family relationships, and health and well-being).
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A. Sorting Without Clustering and Clustering Without Sorting
When dual-income married couples (the vast majority of married
couples) 231 move long distances for employment sorting purposes,
the spouses typically do not both accrue employment advantages.
Unless the maximum sorting position for each spouse is in the same
location at the same time, one spouse will need to compromise on
employment (by moving and giving up a job or staying and
foregoing an opportunity). 232 In such circumstances, employment
sorting and family clustering conflict: the sorting positions for each
spouse may be in different locations, but the cluster requires them to
remain together. Alternatives to locating the spouses’ employment in
the same location—long-distance marriage and long-distance
commuting—pose their own significant costs. 233
The tradeoffs required between spouses by this conflict of sorting
and clustering can be stark. While moving for even the sorting
spouse destroys economically relevant strong ties, it also typically
provides economic benefits, as well as an opportunity to recreate
these ties over time. Because the clustering spouse does not typically
enjoy employment benefits from sorting, and may be unemployed in
the new location, her opportunities to regenerate economically
relevant strong ties are further hampered. In addition, relocating
multiple times to “trade off” on career opportunities is not a strategy
that can be easily employed. Moving is expensive, not only because
of relocation costs, but because of the mobility frictions that are the
subject of this Article.
Employment sorting focuses on individual employees, not on
two employees—spouses—who are geographically tied. In providing
no protections via at-will employment, sorting can happen regardless
of the sorting of a spouse (think of a mandatory transfer), in contrast
to a regime of contract employment in which couples could try to
negotiate compatible contracts. Because of singular sorting, married
couples must decide who benefits from the unequal sorting that
results from long-distance moves.
On the flip side, family clustering, which provides some social-tie

231. See ROSE M. KREIDER & DIANA B. ELLIOTT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S
FAMILY AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2007, at 10 (2009).
232. Interestingly, family law in other countries may permit the intact family to submit
location decisions to a court. In Spain, for instance, married couples with children can seek
judicial resolution of a disputed relocation decision. See Max Rheinstein & Mary Ann Glendon,
Interspousal Relations, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 12–13
(Chloros ed., 1980).
233. See infra Parts V.B, V.C.
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cushion for the family, does not account for enhanced sorting on the
part of the sorting spouse, which often results in enhanced clustering
on the part of the clustering spouse (i.e., a shift of more of the
support role the family provides to this spouse). 234 Therefore,
assigning the sorting role to one spouse often results in assigning
additional clustering responsibilities resulting from a long-distance
move to the other spouse. The sorting spouse not only benefits from
sorting, but, by taking on the role of the primary worker, is also less
burdened by insufficient family clustering. Indeed, it is precisely the
strong-tie insurance that the family cluster provides that eases the
consequences of strong-tie losses for sorting spouses. But instead of
clustering benefits to match the sorting benefits for her spouse, the
clustering spouse faces deficits through the loss of strong ties caused
by underclustering. In this way, the limitations of sorting and
clustering further skew the distribution of sorting and clustering
within a marriage.
UI benefits for clustering spouses only partially address this
conflict between employment sorting and family clustering. The
benefits do not fully replace income, nor do they compensate for lost
firm-specific human capital or strong workplace ties. Partial wage
replacement may afford an opportunity for more rigorous job search
in the new location. 235 But by only compensating for some of the
lost opportunity to sort, and by failing to provide any clustering
support, the law fails to compensate the full range of losses the
clustering spouse faces.
Over time, the relative distribution of sorting and clustering
becomes more lopsided. Marriage involves repeat bargaining: “the
winner[] in one round get[s] a satisfactory outcome that would
typically include not only more immediate benefit but also a better
placing (and greater bargaining power) in the future.” 236 When the
sorting spouse drives the move, she will accrue disproportionate
gains to career, while the clustering spouse will accrue
disproportionate losses. This makes it more likely that the sorting
spouse will drive the next move, and so on. While the initial gap may
be small, it can grow quite wide over time, and trading off will

234. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 32–36 (2000) (describing the primary/secondary worker
dynamic, and how carework is shifted to the secondary worker).
235. See Lester, supra note 86, at 342–43.
236. See Amartya Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES:
WOMEN AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123, 137 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) (“Finding a more
‘productive’ employment . . . may . . . contribute not only to immediate well-being, but also to
acquired skill and a better breakdown position for the future”).
AND
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become less likely. This places pressure on role specialization in
marriage, casting some doubt on the prospects for egalitarian
marriage with equally shared responsibilities in the home and the
market.
B. The Relative Distribution of Sorting and Clustering
In married couples, husbands tend to sort, and wives tend to
cluster. Husbands’ jobs are more likely to determine residential
location, and wives are more likely to leave a job to accommodate a
partner’s job change. 237 This makes wives more likely to be “tied
movers.” 238 On the flip side, married women are less likely to relocate
for enhanced employment opportunities, perhaps because their
husbands are differentially willing to relocate for their wives’
careers. 239 This makes wives more likely to be “tied stayers.” 240
This results in dramatic income differentials between husbands
and wives. Whereas long-distance mobility boosts the career
development of married men, for married women, mobility is
accompanied by lower rates of employment and income growth. 241
When couples move, the income gap between husbands and wives
increases significantly, on average to the tune of nearly $3,000. 242 In
fact, the impact of mobility is similar to the birth of a child on
husbands’ and wives’ relative earnings. 243
Economists have proposed that family sorting decisions are
determined by comparative advantages in human capital—i.e.,
sorting decisions will favor the partner who has the comparative
advantage in market labor at the outset 244—or by favorable changes
in net family income—i.e., sorting decisions are based on the sum
total of gain of income for one partner and loss of income for the
other partner. 245 But differences in human capital investments and
237. See SUSAN HANSON & GERALDINE PRATT, GENDER, WORK, AND SPACE 105, 126–
27 (1995).
238. Joy E. Pixley & Phyllis Moen, Prioritizing Careers, in IT’S ABOUT TIME 183, 184
(Phyllis Moen ed., 2003) (emphasis added).
239. Id. at 186.
240. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
241. Kimberlee A. Shauman & Mary C. Noonan, Family Migration and Labor Force
Outcomes: Sex Differences in Occupational Context, 85 SOC. FORCES 1735, 1735 (2007).
242. Id. at 1748 (finding that moving tends to increase the annual earnings gap between
husbands and wives by an average of $2,680).
243. See Thomas J. Cooke et al., Longitudinal Analysis of Family Migration and the
Gender Gap in Earnings in the United States and Great Britain, 46 DEMOGRAPHY 150
(2009).
244. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 57 (1981).
245. Jacob Mincer, Family Migration Decisions, 86 J. POL. ECON. 749, 750 (1978).
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income do not tell the whole story, suggesting that gender itself is a
significant factor in determining the relative distribution of sorting
and clustering. Married couples give priority to husbands’ careers
and enhanced earnings in making relocation decisions, even
controlling for the effects of human capital investments. 246 Wives’
earning potential has little influence on the effect of mobility on
employment, and, unlike men, mobility decreases their likelihood of
employment. 247 Indeed, women who are most committed to work—
those who work more than full time and those with nonworking
husbands—face the greatest income penalty from family mobility. 248
Therefore, gender, apart from purely economic calculations, plays a
significant role in relocation decisions. To the extent that gender
trumps human capital investments and earning potential in sorting
and clustering decisions, this compromises not only gender equality,
but also efficient employment sorting and is another way in which
sorting and clustering decisions may not be welfare maximizing. 249
While UI benefits for clustering spouses were instituted to ease
these gendered sorting/clustering dynamics, and in particular, to
“help women,” 250 it is not clear whether subsidizing, and thereby
incentivizing these gendered moves, without adequate sorting or
clustering support or compensation, is to women’s benefit. If gender
drives relocation decisions despite efficiency, as research suggests,
there is less reason to be concerned about these incentive effects, as
husbands’ careers may dictate family relocation decisions regardless
of UI benefits. 251
The gendered distribution of sorting and clustering may go a
long way towards explaining the ongoing gender wage gap. The
clustering spouse’s employment prospects in the new location may
be limited. 252 Even an initially small income gap grows over time and

246. See Shauman & Noonan, supra note 241, at 1735 (rejecting human capital theory
based on findings that equalizing the distribution of human capital between married men and
women would not lead to a more equal distribution of the returns to mobility).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1755.
249. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of shortcomings in such decisions.
250. H.R. REP. NO. 110-414, pt. 1 at 72 (2007) (requiring benefits “would particularly
help women, who are . . . more likely to need to leave work . . . [to] follow[] a spouse”).
251. See infra Part V.A.2 for further discussion of incentive effects.
252. See Shauman & Noonan, supra note 241, at 1745 (compared to immobile wives,
those who move are 22% less likely to remain employed across any one-year interval, and their
earnings grow by 760 fewer dollars). Of course the clustering spouse may place limits on
relocation for her own employment purposes. For example, she might refuse to move without
a job lined up in the new location.
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as a result of additional long-distance moves. 253 And gender
differentials in sorting and clustering become even more problematic
following a divorce. After years of the husband sorting and the wife
clustering, the income gap, exacerbated by these mobility measures,
may not be compensated upon divorce. 254
Employment exit (or threat of exit) may have a different
signaling function to employers based on gender. It is often assumed
that “[m]en can change jobs, because the presumption is that they
are ‘moving up,’ and all rational employers want talented, ambitious
workers, even if they sometimes lose them.” 255 If women sort,
however, “the inference might not be so much that they were
talented and ambitious, like men, but rather than they had to follow
their husband around. A rational firm would be wary of hiring
someone who might move for reasons it could not know or
control.” 256 And given that women are more likely to be tied stayers,
employers may believe that they don’t need to “match higher wage
opportunities available in distant locations” for women employees,
contributing to the gender wage gap. 257
These gendered sorting and clustering dynamics may also create
preemptive anti-sorting effects for women. Although Title VII bars
sex discrimination in employment, employers may be less likely to
consider women for positions that require relocation. 258 The recent
sex-discrimination class action against Wal-Mart was based in part on
the company’s requirement that sales associates be willing to relocate
for promotions. 259 The dissent noted the risk “that managers will act
on the familiar assumption that women, because of their services to
husband and children, are less mobile than men.” 260
Gendered sorting and clustering dynamics may even contribute

253. See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993).
254. See Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2227, 2247 & n.91 (1994) (discussing how temporary alimony fails to account for
gendered market labor and carework dynamics within marriage).
255. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 259 (1997).
256. Id. Although federal law bars hiring discrimination on the basis of sex, it still occurs
with frequency. See Schoenbaum, supra note 70, at 125–26.
257. William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender-Role
Beliefs, and Reluctance to Relocate for a Better Job, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1241, 1241 (1992).
258. DEP’T OF LAB., FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 151 (1995) (reporting that women
are not asked to relocate as frequently as men).
259. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
260. Id.
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to gender differences in initial career choices, with a corresponding
impact on the wage gap. One of the defining features of the U.S.
labor market is occupational segregation by sex. Approximately onethird to 40% of employed women would have to switch occupational
categories to replicate the male occupational distribution pattern. 261
This is a distinction with a difference for mobility purposes: the
“pink collar” jobs largely populated by women tend to be
geographically ubiquitous—that is, they can be done anywhere. 262
The geographic ubiquity of women’s occupations assists in family
clustering, because women’s employment can be less of a drag on
their husbands’ sorting preferences. 263 But this flexibility comes with
a cost: these geographically ubiquitous jobs pay less. 264 Occupational
segregation affects married and single women alike. So traditional
economic theories of family relocation may have it exactly
backwards—it is not that women trail because they earn less; women
may earn less because they expect (or are expected) to trail. 265
V. MOBILITY MODIFICATIONS
Mobility for sorting purposes has generally been recognized as an
unmitigated good. While mobility may have significant benefits, the
relationship and economic costs, as well as the distributional
consequences, imposed by employment sorting in light of family
clustering complicate this story. Determining the optimum level of
mobility and whether we are currently above or below that optimum
level is beyond the scope of this Article. This Part nonetheless tries to
make progress not primarily by adjusting mobility levels, but instead
by suggesting three principal ways to adjust sorting and clustering to
provide better support upon a move and to recognize strong ties

261. Michael Ransom & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Intrafirm Mobility and Sex Differences in
Pay, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 219, 220 (2005).
262. Some examples are school teachers, nurses, and secretaries. See Shauman & Noonan,
supra note 241, at 1738–39.
263. Larry H. Long, Women’s Labor Force Participation and the Residential Mobility of
Families, 52 J. SOC. FORCES 342, 348 (1974).
264. Women earned 75% of what their male counterparts earned in 2009, U.S. DEP’T. OF
COMMERCE,
WOMEN
IN
AMERICA
7
(2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/Women_in_America.pdf. Some
proportion of the pay gap is attributable to occupational segregation. See Paula England,
Gender Inequality in Labor Markets: The Role of Motherhood and Segregation, 12 SOC. POL.
264, 276 (2005).
265. Janice Compton & Robert A. Pollak, Why are Power Couples Increasingly
Concentrated in Large Metropolitan Areas?, 25 J. LAB. ECON. 475, 479 (2007) (collecting
studies consistent with this effect, and noting that in light of expectations of clustering,
“women may tend to enter more mobile careers”).
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outside of the nuclear family: (1) recalibrating employment sorting,
(2) recalibrating family clustering, and (3) exploring the
agglomeration benefits of cities as a way to mitigate sorting and
clustering costs by providing more job opportunities in one place.
These ideas are not meant to put an end to mobility, but to allow for
better sorting and clustering decisions, and to alleviate some of
mobility’s costs and distributional burdens while enhancing its
benefits.
A. Recalibrating Employment Sorting
Recalibrating employment sorting through adjustments to at-will
employment or laws that eliminate barriers to sorting would be
overbroad because these laws reach far beyond sorting. A better
approach would be to adjust the costs of sorting for both employers
and employees. The goal of these adjustments is to improve
employer and employee sorting decisions, to incentivize employers
to internalize some of the costs of sorting, and to provide better
support to offset the costs of sorting.
1. Recalibrating sorting costs for employers
Making hiring long-distance sorters relatively more expensive for
employers would internalize some of the costs of sorting on nonsorting parties. Employers will then take steps to avoid long-distance
sorting when the employer could achieve the same result with nearby
workers and rely on sorting only when the benefits exceed the
recalibrated costs. Placing a modest cost on long-distance sorting
could offset employers’ shortcomings in decision making that lead
them to underestimate the productivity costs of sorting. 266 While
employers share some of the productivity costs of lost strong ties, 267
they also accrue benefits from long-distance sorting 268 and so should
also internalize the costs. Moreover, the employer is the least cost
avoider for optimizing sorting. 269 The firm is in the best position not
only to know when sorting is necessary for its business purposes, but
also to implement measures that would integrate employees into the
workplace and the community. 270 Employers are also easier targets
266. See supra Part III.C.
267. See supra Part III.B.1.
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205–06 (7th ed. 2007)
(explaining that when harm can be avoided by more than one actor, the lowest-cost harm
avoider should do so, since that will best avert the harm).
270. See Kevin J. Coco, Beyond the Price Tag: An Economic Analysis of Title III of the
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than individuals for de-biasing efforts.
A direct measure to adjust the relative costs of sorting would
make it more expensive for employers to hire long-distance sorters as
compared with local employees. Many areas of employment law rely
on the distinction between “local” and “non-local” workers, defined
by whether the employee lives within a “reasonable commuting
distance” of her job. 271 The UI experience-rating system could
require increased employer contributions based on the number of
long-distance sorters the employer hires. The funds generated could
go to providing the employer contribution breaks or benefits to
long-distance sorters suggested below. 272 To the extent that these
costs are passed through to sorters in the form of lower wages, this is
not necessarily undesirable, as this could internalize the costs that
sorters now impose on their communities. The UI scheme is a
natural home for these requirements because it is meant to address
macroeconomic issues of labor supply and demand, including
employment sorting. 273 Any constitutional problems with local hiring
preferences will be limited to public employers. 274
2. Recalibrating sorting costs for employees
Facilitating laws that provide subsidies to offset the costs of
sorting also incentivize precisely that costly behavior. The challenge
of avoiding a moral hazard that arises when, as in the case of moving,
a beneficiary can control eligibility for benefits, is a stubborn
problem in the law. 275 The seemingly elusive goal here would be to
provide needed support for those who would make moves but for
the subsidy without incentivizing additional moves. There is
insufficient data on the incentive effects of sorting subsidies that

Americans with Disabilities Act, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 58, 92 (2010).
271. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(b)(3) (explaining that “‘reasonable commuting distance’
will vary with local and industry conditions,” and that “consideration should be given to the
following factors: geographic accessibility of the place of work, the quality of the roads,
customarily available transportation, and the usual travel time”).
272. See infra Part V.A.2.
273. See Lester, supra note 86, at 342–43.
274. See Keaton Norquist, Local Preferences in Affordable Housing: Special Treatment For
Those Who Live or Work in a Municipality?, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 207, 209, 214–21
(2009).
275. See Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1453, 1503–06 (2004) (discussing the “controllability” problem in providing
benefits for dependence support); Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation,
in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 77, 85
(1984) (defining “moral hazard” as when “[t]he insurance policy might itself change
incentives and therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company has relied”).
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would permit a conclusive analysis of the trade-offs of incentive
effects with the need for support. 276 In time, state-by-state
implementation of UI benefits for clustering spouses will provide a
natural experiment across states with and without these benefits,
with data ripe for study. 277 Until such data is available, there are
other ways to think about the problem.
The purpose of sorting subsidies is to offset some of the costs of
sorting. In particular, UI benefits for clustering spouses partially
offset lost wages. Although these benefits are paid to the clustering
spouse, they increase household income, and may accrue to the
benefit of more than just the clustering spouse. 278 To the extent the
financial impact of a spouse’s job loss on the family is alleviated by
these benefits, the clustering spouse’s power in bargaining over the
relocation is reduced. However, UI benefits provide income that
may permit a more prolonged search to enhance job opportunities in
the new location. 279 While the benefits of needed support may
outweigh the incentive effects, 280 cash subsidies could be adjusted to
reduce incentives for more costly moves by incorporating a form of
experience rating so that benefits are decreased as the number of
moves increases above a threshold, 281 or by providing a bonus
payment for moves close to strong ties. 282
Although cash subsidies are generally thought to be more
efficient, 283 alternative mechanisms may better mitigate incentive

276. See generally Ernie Goss & Chris Paul, The Impact of Unemployment Insurance
Benefits on the Probability of Migration of the Unemployed, 30 J. REG. SCI. 349 (1990)
(discussing conflicting data on whether UI benefits increase or decrease mobility).
277. Such comparisons across states have been conducted on the effects of minimum
wage on employment levels. See generally David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages
and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84
AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994).
278. Who receives the household benefits may matter for how the benefits are allocated
among members of the household. Jackie Goode et al., Findings: Distribution of Income
Within Families Receiving Benefits, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION (1998), available at
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/spr468.pdf (finding that benefits paid directly to
mothers are more likely to be spent in ways that benefit children or the family as a whole than
if they go to fathers). To the extent that mothers are more willing to sacrifice benefits and
expend them on others, this suggests that mother clustering spouses may be less likely to
expend UI benefits in ways that will enhance their opportunities—e.g., interview attire, career
coaching, etc., defeating some of the purpose of UI benefits.
279. See Lester, supra note 86, at 342.
280. See supra Part IV.B on gender and incentive effects.
281. See Fennell, supra note 275, at 1505 (noting experience rating as a mechanism to
correct moral hazard).
282. See infra Part V.B.2 on corrective mobility.
283. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 230 (2004)
(“[G]enerally speaking, in-kind subsidies are thought of as less efficient than cash subsidies
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effects. In-kind subsidies in the form of sorting accommodations in
the new location could do so by trading on biases related to sorting.
Because sorters do not fully appreciate sorting consequences ex
ante, 284 they also would be unlikely to appreciate fully the value of
this subsidy ex ante, making incentive effects less likely as well. This
means in-kind benefits can be calibrated to provide additional
support to individuals and families who make moves that impose
greater costs—repeated moves, longer distance moves, and moves to
locations where there are no strong ties—with less concern about
further incentivizing these moves. 285 To the extent that sorting
accommodations integrate newcomers into the community, they act
as universal programs promoting strong ties for all, which are likely
to garner broader support. 286 To the extent that cash subsidies might
be appropriated for other household uses, 287 in-kind benefits assure
their use for the clustering spouse. Finally, some of the strong-tie
losses that sorters experience cannot easily be replaced in the market
and can be better provided through in-kind organizational efforts,
whether by public entities or employers, aimed at creating
communities.
In-kind relocation assistance could be publicly provided, or
incentives could be implemented for employers to provide this
support (who would then have the option to outsource it). While
employers will benefit from these programs, broader community
benefits, along with potential free-riding problems of employerprovided support (due to difficulty internalizing these community
benefits) might augur in favor of public provision. A range of
scholarship urges employers to take steps to overcome the
“entrenched and often unnoticed barriers”, 288 preventing employers
from providing support for employees, and therefore failing to
optimize the employment relationship. Incentives for employers to
provide relocation accommodations for long-distance sorters would
not only address the relationship and economic costs of strong-tie
losses, 289 but would also make hiring long-distance sorters modestly

because the recipient may only use the in-kind subsidy for specified purposes.”).
284. See supra Part III.C.
285. See supra Parts III.A.2.a and III.B.3.
286. See Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? Law, Social
Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, 64 TAX L. REV. 313, 317, 331–39 (2011)
(exploring ways in which universal programs generate greater political support).
287. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
288. See Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).
289. See Benjamin & Eigles, supra note 26, at 259 (discussing the need for broader
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more expensive for employers, at least in the short term, leading
employers to rely on sorting more judiciously. This would help to
enhance the welfare effects of sorting in the face of imperfect
decision making.
Employers could encourage long-distance movers to create
professional strong ties in the new location by supporting activities
that bring distance movers together with more senior employees,
such as management retreats, company social events, community
service activities, and networking functions. 290 Intra-company
advocacy groups, such as the Xerox Corporation’s Black Caucus, can
build important ties bridging departments within the firm. 291 Even
firm architecture can make a difference. A lunchroom where distance
movers can meet other employees can promote strong ties. This type
of sorting support may create a workplace culture that more readily
incorporates sorters, normalizing their influx and reducing their lack
of legitimacy. Strong workplace ties can also mitigate relationship
costs, as coworkers can become personal friends, 292 who can then
introduce sorters to new ties and help integrate them into the
community.
Employers could also establish mechanisms for “outsider” longdistance movers to “borrow” social capital from more senior
employees until they earn legitimacy within the firm. Borrowing
social capital involves developing a strong tie with a “legitimate”
figure and then connecting to that employee’s strong ties. In Japan,
industry-specific directories that put outsiders in touch with
legitimate insider figures assist in developing relationships with
Japanese companies. 293 Distance movers could utilize similar
directories of legitimate figures within a firm or professional
community to borrow social capital.
For long-distance sorters who move with family members, an
even bigger concern is the family’s adjustment to the area, in
particular, a spouse’s employment adjustment. 294 To ease this stress,
and to mitigate the gendered distribution of sorting and clustering,
employers could provide assistance for clustering spouses to find
work in the new location through local contacts, career counseling,
relocation assistance for spousal employment and family adjustment).
290. See Pearce & Randel, supra note 186, at 86 (suggesting that employers promote
social interaction between employees to develop greater commitment to the employer).
291. Id.
292. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
293. See Ronald S. Burt, The Network Structure of Social Capital, 22 RES. ORG.
BEHAVIOR 345, 399–400 (2000).
294. See Munton, supra note 201, at 105.
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and placement services. The federal government is already at work
on providing such support to spouses of service members as part of a
government-wide initiative to improve support to military families,
especially with relation to repeated long-distance sorting. 295
Still further, employers could mitigate the additional pressure on
support functions after a long-distance move. The lack of public or
private support for caregiving and its interference with employment
advancement, especially for women, has received much attention. 296
While greater support for caregiving would ease the burdens of
sorting, general consideration of this topic is outside the scope of
this Article. My focus is different: how mobility measures construct
circumstances in which individuals and families are without even
their privately arranged caregiving supports. Employers could assist
sorters with support to regenerate these private arrangements,
through, for example, referral services for care-providers, as well as
the flexibility to make these arrangements (and to perform more
caregiving until they are made). Limiting these services just to the
time period after a move provides them when they are most needed
and makes them cheaper and thus more palatable to employers.
A number of mechanisms could incentivize employers to provide
such accommodations. Employers who provide this sort of support
to their employees could get a break in their contributions to the UI
fund. Another soft enforcement mechanism would be mandatory
disclosure of employers’ sorting adjustment policies and programs
for new hires and transfers. This type of “‘targeted transparency’”—
an increasingly popular tool for nudging private behavior—does not
seek merely to provide better information, but also to enhance
performance beyond the scope of mandates. 297 Many large firms
already try to cultivate a reputation for going beyond compliance on
salient issues that affect worker welfare, 298 like adjustment assistance
for long-distance movers. Mandatory disclosure of sorting
adjustment programs could lead to a race to the top for these

295. See PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 163, at 15–20. A report rolling
out the initiative notes that 93% of the military spouse population is female, that the overall
wage gap between civilian and military wives is 42%, and that among households that moved
the year prior to the survey, the wage gap rises to over 47%. Id.
296. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1
(2005).
297. See Cynthia Estlund, Just The Facts: The Case For Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 351, 376–77 (2011).
298. Id. at 378–79.
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programs. Finally, education campaigns by federal or state labor
departments could reduce employers’ bias in sorting decisions,
especially by making employers more aware of the benefits to the
firm of employees’ strong ties.
Another way to recalibrate sorting costs would be to make an
alternative to sorting—telework—cheaper. Aside from a host of
environmental
and
work-family
balance
benefits
of
telecommuting, 299 the costs of long-distance sorting provide another
reason to increase opportunities for telework. Telework would allow
a worker to sort without the need for geographic proximity to the
workplace. Telework could be supplemented with in-office visits and
conference calls so that strong workplace ties can still develop.
Although telework is not an option for all jobs, technological
improvements and increasing availability of remote work may make
this a possibility for a growing number of workers. 300 Requirements
for federal agencies to implement telework policies and increase the
number of off-site workers, as well as more recent support for
telecommuting by the President’s Council of Economic Advisers 301
and the First Lady herself, 302 suggest that telework may become
increasingly common and accepted.
Tax law may serve as an impediment to telework, especially
across state borders. An employer located in one state with a single
employee telecommuting in another state can face tax obligations
from the state where the employee resides. 303 A telecommuting
employee whose employer and home are in different states may face

299. See Ravi S. Gajendran & David A. Harrison, The Good, the Bad, and the Unknown
About Telecommuting: Meta-Analysis of Psychological Mediators and Individual Consequences,
92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1524 (2007).
300. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WORKING AT HOME 2000 (PHC-T-35), TABLE 1-1, ALL
WORKERS, AND WORKERS WHO WORKED AT HOME FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1960 TO 2000
(2004) (showing that in the 1980s the number of people working from home increased by
more than 50% and in the 1990s by more than 20%).
301. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS’,
WORK-LIFE BALANCE AND THE ECONOMICS OF WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/100331-cea-economics-workplaceflexibility.pdf.
302. Remarks by the First Lady at a Workplace Flexibility Conference, WASHINGTON POST,
Mar.
31,
2010,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033103642.html.
303. In a recent tax ruling, Colorado imposed state income and sales tax obligations on a
Miami-based company with one telecommuter in Colorado. See Marvin Kirsner, Tax Rulings
Make Trouble for Telecommuting Employees, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2010/04/12/focus5.html.
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double state taxation, 304 and telecommuters, as compared to those
who are self-employed, may be excluded from the home office tax
deduction. 305 These barriers to telecommuting should be replaced
with more favorable tax treatment.
B. Recalibrating Family Clustering
The family cluster can be recalibrated to provide better
cushioning for and against long-distance moves by expanding the
scope of strong ties recognized as a cluster relevant for geographic
purposes. A number of possible configurations, both those limited to
times of mobility, as well as broader interventions, are discussed
below. To further recalibrate the family cluster, I propose ways in
which the law should recognize the significance of strong ties as a
reason for long-distance moves.
1. Reconfiguring the family cluster
A narrow intervention would expand the individuals eligible for
relocation subsidies beyond the nuclear family. For example, not just
spouses, but other strong ties such as close friends or extended
family members would be eligible for UI benefits if they wished to
move over distances with their strong ties who were relocating for
employment purposes. Such subsidies would not have to go to the
same individual or individuals upon each move. This would mean
that entrenched sorting and clustering roles would be unlikely, as
individuals, in shifting relocation ties, could also trade off in sorting
and clustering roles. Taking relocation benefits outside of marriage
would acknowledge the importance of strong ties in addition to the
family cluster. This would especially benefit singles and may help to
de-gender sorting and clustering dynamics.
The potential for a larger cluster means that the relative
distribution of sorting and clustering could be beneficially adjusted.
While one member of the cluster may still receive the primary
benefits of sorting, several members could absorb the additional
clustering responsibilities, which would afford each more time to
balance these with work. Of course, expanding the class of persons

304. See Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National
Economy, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 885, 886–87 (2008).
305. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (2006); Lauren Marini, Note, “Simplification” Is Not
Enough: An Analysis of the Home Office Tax Deduction and the Home Office Simplification Act
of 2009, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 107, 123–24 (2010) (explaining the challenge telecommuters
have in showing that home office is used “for the convenience of [their] employer,” in line
with deductions allowed under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)).
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who are eligible for clustering subsidies could also expand the
number whose employment may be disrupted by a move. Practical
considerations would likely keep the members of the cluster to a
reasonably small number, and the number could be limited to guard
against overly disruptive clusters.
Without the security that comes from a more stable
commitment, however, strong ties might be reluctant to make a
long-distance move, especially in light of strong family clustering
norms. 306 To shift the contours of the family cluster then requires
not just interventions around mobility, but more significant
interventions reconfiguring the family cluster—in other words,
rethinking the foundational enabling laws that shape the cluster
itself. Doing so would require providing legal recognition to nonnuclear family relationships.
One reconfiguration of the cluster would grant marital rights and
privileges of care and support to any designated strong tie, what I
refer to as “designated partners.” France and Canada already allow
two economically interdependent people who live together to
designate each other for a legal status in which they perform
marriage-like care and support functions. 307 Alternatively, as Martha
Fineman has proposed, the state could recognize and support
relationships that involve dependent caregiving rather than
marriage. 308 Providing rights and duties of care and support to those
outside the nuclear family would reshape the family cluster to include
designated partners or Fineman’s caregivers. Facilitating laws could
also include relocation subsidies for these designated partners or
caregivers.
Expanding family clustering along these lines would afford
singles the option to be in the same position as married couples visà-vis long-distance moves by entering into a designated partnership:
to have one strong tie come with you upon a move, and to have one
strong tie not move without you. But a system of designated
partners is still limited to a pair (or perhaps a larger but still small

306. See Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything that Grows”: Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 823–24 n.10, 837 (1985) (describing the mutually
constitutive and reinforcing nature of legal family norms and social norms).
307. State regulation of strong ties outside of the nuclear family could be subject to the
criticism that scholars have raised with regard to legal recognition of same-sex relationships,
which is that recognition of these relationships can rob them of their unique character by
holding them subject to the prevailing legal norms. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics
of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006).
308. There are approximately 3.6 million married Americans living apart (not including
separated couples). See KREIDER & ELLIOT, supra note 231, at 5.
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number for Fineman’s caregivers), so like marriage, it continues to
ignore other strong ties. This option does offer a substantial
improvement over marriage in states that restrict the union to
couples of opposite gender. Same-sex designated partners moving
together could change the odds that men or women predominantly
sort or cluster, destabilizing gendered sorting and clustering
dynamics.
Another reconfiguration of the family cluster would unbundle
the rights and privileges associated with marriage and allow
individuals, single or married, to divide these rights and privileges
among different relationships, as proposed by Laura Rosenbury. 309
Not only would this “unbundling” allow spouses and unmarried
individuals alike to detach their relocation subsidies from other
privileges and expand the scope of strong ties that are recognized
upon a move, but by providing rights and privileges to those outside
the nuclear family, it would make it more likely that we would
remain near or move with these strong ties. The legal unbundling of
rights and privileges across strong ties has the expressive power to
unravel the tightness of the family cluster as the only site for
geographically significant ties. 310 This could lead to a rebalancing of
the domestic family and other strong ties in the mobility calculus.
While we may choose to stay near or move with non-nuclear-family
strong ties without intervention of the law, arranging one’s life
around others is risky without the security that comes with legal
protection.
Spreading the rights and privileges associated with marriage
across persons, as suggested by Laura Rosenbury, might cut back on
the portability of both singles and family clusters. But the flexibility
of this scheme would afford some ability to calibrate the portability
of the cluster, both through the number of ties that were afforded
rights, and how the rights were distributed. Some marital obligations
require physical presence (e.g., FMLA benefits); others can be
satisfied from afar (e.g., social security benefits). Geographically
sensitive obligations could be granted to nearby strong ties that an
individual wants to remain near, and geographically insensitive
obligations could be granted to strong ties who live far away or are
highly mobile. Those seeking more rootedness could spread rights
and privileges across multiple persons within her community; those

309. The “two-body” problem these couples face has received attention. See generally
LISA WOLF-WENDEL ET AL., THE TWO-BODY PROBLEM: DUAL CAREER COUPLE HIRING
POLICIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2003).
310. See Jennifer Conlin, Living Apart for the Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at B1.
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seeking more mobility could be more parsimonious (or could spread
these rights and privileges across persons in different geographic
areas where she might move). Some limit on flexibility is needed,
however, because at some point the administrability concern
outweighs flexibility. A mechanism akin to “divorce” could allow
individuals to rearrange rights and duties across strong ties to
accommodate long-distance moves. While the flexibility of
unbundling may increase the cost of administration, 311 these costs
must be balanced against the benefit that, unlike marriage, a take-itor-leave-it status, this unbundled option allows for individual
choice. 312
Something akin to this unbundling of marriage is already
happening de facto in a small but growing number of families. 313
While the law embodies a strong presumption of nuclear family
unity, employment sorting may trump family clustering such that
spouses live apart in “commuter” or “long-distance” marriages,
either temporarily or for the duration of the relationship.
Historically, long-distance marriage is associated with a couple in
which both spouses are strongly attached to geographically specific
careers, for example, a dual-academic couple. 314 In these cases,
sorting for both spouses may trump clustering. In the slack labor
market of the Great Recession, long-distance marriages are on the
rise, and encompass a broader set of couples who have physically
separated for lack of better options. 315
Long-distance spouses face significant challenges in a world
where the law grants all care and support obligations to spouses and
not to other strong ties. The unbundling of the obligations of
marriage would ease some of the burdens of a long-distance marriage
by allowing some care and support functions to be provided by other
nearby strong ties. While for the vast majority of long-distance
marriages, physical separation is a second-best option, these
marriages nonetheless may constructively challenge gendered
sorting/clustering dynamics. In addition to unbundling the cluster,

311. See I.R.C. §§ 163–164 (2006).
312. State regulation of strong ties outside of the nuclear family could be subject to the
criticism that scholars have raised with regard to legal recognition of same-sex relationships,
which is that recognition of these relationships can rob them of their unique character by
holding them subject to the prevailing legal norms. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics
of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006).
313. There are approximately 3.6 million married Americans living apart (excluding
separated couples). Conlin, supra note 310.
314. See generally WOLF-WENDEL, ET AL., supra note 309.
315. See Conlin, supra note 310.
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the law could better support these couples by allowing them to
consider both of their homes primary residences for tax purposes, as
current law allows only one home to receive this beneficial tax
treatment, 316 and by providing a tax deduction for the
communication and visitation costs of maintaining these
relationships.
2. Recognizing relocations motivated by strong ties
Aside from reconfiguring the family cluster, the law could
recognize and support strong ties outside the nuclear family by
putting relocations motivated by strong ties on equal footing with
those motivated by employment sorting. This would mean that
whatever benefits are afforded for long-distance sorting should be
extended to relocations to be near strong ties. Short of this, the law
could provide symmetrical subsidies for corrective relocations. There
are two types of moves that would qualify as corrective. First,
corrective mobility would be satisfied by a move that returned the
movers to a place where they had developed a strong-tie network, for
example, a place where they had previously lived. Second, corrective
mobility would be satisfied by a move to a place where the mover
would have stayed in or moved to but for the influence of the family
cluster, for example, a post-divorce move that would allow a
clustering spouse to return to her home town. In custody relocation
cases, equal consideration should be given to a parent who seeks to
move for strong-tie support as a parent who seeks to move for
employment. An additionally strong presumption favoring relocation
should apply to cases of corrective mobility.
C. Agglomeration: The Benefits of Sorting Without All the Costs
The problem of mobility measures can be seen as a problem of
distance: the distance between the jobs of the spouses if both were to
sort maximally for employment, and the distance between strong ties
that mobility imposes. One solution is to shorten the distance by
agglomerating many employment opportunities, as well as strong
ties, in one place. This is precisely the benefit provided by cities, and
so sorting and clustering might be altered to acknowledge that
reality. “Agglomeration economics,” the notion that “individuals
and businesses make their location decisions on the basis of where
other individuals and businesses decide to locate” has garnered much

316. See I.R.C. §§ 163–164 (2006).
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recent attention. 317 The positive externalities of agglomeration might
better balance sorting and clustering considerations.
Agglomeration of firms and people in cities presents increased
labor market depth, both on the supply and demand side. Deep
labor markets provide a greater opportunity to sort across employers
to maximize labor value without changing geography. Labor market
depth enhances employment sorting because “[a]s urban workers
develop new skills, they can switch to suitable jobs” without moving,
which incentivizes human capital investments. 318 Deep labor markets
reduce job search costs, allowing employees to sort among firms
more easily and better maximize productivity. 319 Multiple
employment options means one employer failing does not require a
move to find other employment. Because of reduced search and
sorting costs, incentives to develop human capital, and intellectual
spillovers, agglomeration may promote growth better than
geographic sorting.
Because agglomeration reduces the need for long-distance moves
to sort, labor value can be maximized without sacrificing local strong
ties and the support they provide. Of course, sorting across jobs even
without a long-distance move will impose the loss of strong
workplace ties. But these lost ties will be less significant because they
will remain in the circle of local professional contacts. Moreover, the
loss of strong ties in the workplace will not be felt as acutely when it
is not accompanied by all of the additional losses—strong social ties,
spousal job loss, disruption for children—imposed by a long-distance
move.
Increasing the ability to sort across jobs without a long-distance
move would alleviate the conflict that singles currently face: moving
for a job opportunity, or staying near their strongest ties. The more
that singles can retain their strong ties over time, the more secure
they will feel in those ties, and the more rooted they may become.
Greater stability of strong-tie support for singles could go some way
towards alleviating the privilege of marriage over other strong ties. 320
Cities also provide singles with a deeper market for new strong ties,
which can be important for new friends and for dating, for those
who seek to develop new family clusters. 321

317. See Schleicher, supra note 27, at 1509.
318. Id. at 1521.
319. See id. at 1532.
320. See Rosenbury, supra note 98, at 191 (describing how family law privileges marriage
over other mutually supportive relationships).
321. See id.

1228

1165

Mobility Measures

Living in a major metropolitan area can also reduce the conflict
between sorting and clustering within the family. The deeper labor
markets found in cities present more employment opportunities for
two workers in the same place. 322 Indeed, there is a higher
percentage of two-career couples in which both spouses have a
college degree living in the largest metropolitan areas, 323 and the gap
between married men’s and married women’s incomes decreases
with urban size. 324 Because sorting across jobs will less often require
a long-distance move, the strong-tie network remains in place.
Although there may be greater career pressures and more demanding
work expectations in large metropolitan areas that make it harder to
balance work and family, the consistency of strong ties provided by a
stable location can offset these demands.
To optimize employment sorting in light of family clustering, it
is not just agglomeration, but dense agglomeration that is best. The
expense of living in an urban center often leads people to live and
work in the suburbs—sometimes different suburbs. 325 This means
that individuals commute longer distances between home and work
and that maximizing sorting for both spouses, who may have jobs in
different suburbs, can involve long commutes. Americans spend on
average fifty minutes per day commuting. 326 The number of
Americans engaged in extreme commutes—an hour-and-a-half to
work and back—has grown 95% since 1990, to 3.4 million
workers. 327 While there are many causes for extreme commutes,
employment sorting and family clustering are critical sources. 328
The costs of long commutes are difficult to overstate. In addition
to fuel expense and pollution, commuting takes a big toll on
commuters. Commuting worsens life satisfaction, physical health,
and productivity, 329 and causes a hit to strong ties: every ten minutes
322. See WOLF-WENDEL ET AL., supra note 309, at 5.
323. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Power Couples: Changes in the Locational
Choice of the College Educated, 1940-1990, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1287 (2000).
324. Pixley & Moen, supra note 238, at 186.
325. See Joel Kotkin, The Protean Future of American Cities, NEWGEOGRAPHY.COM
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.newgeography.com/content/002099-the-protean-future-ofamerican-cities.
326. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2005).
327. See id. In 1990, 24% of all workers left their home counties to get to the office; now,
50% of new workers do so. Id.
328. Michelle Conlin et al., Extreme Commuting, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 21,
2005,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_08/b3921127.htm.
329. See Jos N. van Ommeren & Eva Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, Are Workers with a Long
Commute Less Productive? An Empirical Analysis of Absenteeism, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB.
ECON. 1, 2 (2011).
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of commute time cuts one’s social connections by 10%. 330 Long
commutes also burden the already tight time allocation for
employment and caregiving demands. Women are less likely to take
on long commutes for this reason, limiting their employment
opportunities in the context of sprawl. 331
Many employers and residents already recognize the benefits of
cities by choosing to locate there. A significant barrier to
agglomeration is the expense of city living, although this expense is
at least partially compensated by an urban wage premium. 332 The
expense is particularly significant for families, who tend to be more
concerned with the cost of housing given the need for a larger home,
as well as access to good public schools. But residential location
decisions between relatively more or less dense areas are not
independent from legal policies that have affected the cost of such
decisions. Over the last several decades, transportation and housing
law and policy have subsidized suburban and exurban sprawl that has
made suburban and exurban living relatively cheaper in relation to
city living and thus influenced housing and capital location
decisions. 333
Shifting the relative costs of urban as compared with suburban or
exurban locations will make it more attractive for both individuals
and firms to sort to cities. Others have considered how to make cities
relatively cheaper through modifying housing and transportation
policies. 334 The costs associated with long-distance sorting, and the
potential for agglomeration to alleviate these costs, is another reason
to adjust the cost of city living.
Although recalibrating the cost of locating in more and less
dense areas may be best addressed outside of employment law and
family law, mobility measures could be recalibrated so that when
sorting happens, it is more likely to be to cities. One way to promote
agglomeration through mobility measures would be to make sorting
to cities cheaper for employees, through a bonus subsidy for these
moves. Another way to promote sorting to cities would be to
enhance employment opportunities there either directly or indirectly
by encouraging employers to locate there. For example, employers
could be granted further favorable UI treatment, in the form of
330. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 178 (2000).
331. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and WorkFamily Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1826 (2007).
332. See GLAESER, supra note 27, at 52.
333. See Silbaugh, supra note 331, at 1818.
334. See GLAESER, supra note 27, at 139–47.
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reduced contributions into the system, by hiring employees in
metropolitan areas. Favorable tax treatment for city hires could also
be applied. Public-private partnerships for economic growth,
including both industrial recruitment and more entrepreneurial
approaches, could target more resources towards densely populated
metropolitan areas. Not only do these investments reap greater
rewards when they are aimed at areas where there is already
agglomeration, 335 but such investments would also drive more
capital, and thus more employees, towards cities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Good work and close ties, both inside and outside the family, are
two of the most crucial ways we imbue our lives with meaning—and
two of the most crucial aspects of life that affect and are affected by
geographic mobility. Employment law and family law together play a
central role in regulating these critical parts of our lives, and so
together force us to ask the question “how portable is your life?” By
looking at the ways in which these areas of law affect how, why, and
how often we move over distances, we can bring more conscious
consideration to the question of how portable our lives are, and
perhaps even more importantly, how portable we want them to be.
Greater legal recognition of the significance of place-specific
investments, in addition to bearing relationship and economic fruit,
has the further potential even to change—and enhance—our
relationship to place. Moreover, because good work and strong ties
have different meanings for everyone, shifting the legal boundaries of
how and why we move, and what we can take along with us, may
open up a more flexible space to recognize work and ties in ways that
better accommodates varied preferences and circumstances. By
recalibrating the portability of work and significant relationships,
modified mobility measures may allow us to derive more satisfaction
and reward from both—providing more and better answers to the
portability question than we thought possible.

335. See J. Craig Jenkins et al., Do High Technology Policies Work? High Technology
Industry Employment Growth in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1988-1998, 85 SOC. FORCES 267,
289 (2006).
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